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I 
Summary 
Large-scale cruise ships and passenger ships have lately increased significantly in 
numbers and popularity. As a result the number of maritime accidents with 
passenger ships involved has also increased. The Costa Concordia disaster 
represents one of the most dramatic ship evacuations of recent years. International 
maritime law requires all passengers to be evacuated within 30 minutes of an order 
to abandon the ship, but the Costa Concordia evacuation lasted for more than six 
hours. Of the 3229 passengers and 1023 crew known to have been on board – 32 
people drowned. As the cruise- and passenger ships keep getting bigger, with higher 
passenger capacities, the importance of well-functioning evacuation procedures also 
increases. 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to perform a critical analysis of the publicly available 
data on human behavior during the Costa Concordia disaster as reported by the 
media, survivor accounts, and scientific investigations etc. The aim was to find 
possible behavioral factors that may have contributed in reducing the effectiveness 
of the evacuation, as well as identifying potential issues in the current evacuation 
procedures in ships – in light of the issues occurring during the disaster. 
 
In order to get familiarized with the current regulations in the passenger ship 
industry, and common complications in the evacuation procedures in passenger 
ships, a literature study was carried out. The publicly available behavior-data was 
thereafter evaluated in light of current evacuation behavioral theories. One 
conclusion from this thesis is that the behavioral models proved to be useful in the 
interpretation of a passenger ship evacuation disaster, and it is suggested that they 
may also be valuable at a design stage when trying to predict behaviors and actions 
of people in a maritime disaster. 
 
Furthermore, a number of behaviors were identified that might have contributed in 
reducing the effectiveness of the evacuation procedures, including; 
 
• Confusion 
• Freezing (cognitive paralysis) 
• Competitive behavior 
• Insecurity and hesitation 
 
Several management and operational issues were also identified that may have 
contributed in reducing the effectiveness of the evacuation procedures. 
  
• 696 passengers had not yet been briefed on the ship’s safety procedures (as 
this was scheduled for the following day, 14th of January). 
• The public and most of the staff were kept unaware of the severity of the 
situation, prohibiting them from getting mentally prepared for the 
evacuation. 
• The delay of the assembling and disembarking procedures caused precious 
time to be lost and led to a narrow time frame for effective launching of 
lifeboats and rafts. 
   
II 
• Lack of communication between passengers and staff, as well as in between 
staff, involved language barriers and conflicting orders and led to confusion, 
misunderstandings and frustration among the passengers. 
• Seeming lack of understanding and adequate training among part of the staff 
caused disbelief in the leadership among passengers. 
 
To improve the safety in passenger ships it is proposed that additional measures, 
beyond what is currently stated in the regulations, are taken in order to ensure that;  
• Passengers are given adequate information prior to and during an 
emergency. 
• Staff is familiar with the emergency equipment and procedures. 
• Staff is able to communicate with each other as well as with passengers.  
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Sammanfattning 
Stora kryssningsskepp och passagerarfärjor har ökat både i antal och popularitet på 
senare år, och följaktligen har antalet olyckor med passagerarbåtar också ökat. 
Costa Concordia-katastrofen utgör ett exempel på en av vår tids mest dramatiska 
evakueringar av passagerarfartyg. Utrymningen pågick i mer än sex timmar, trots 
att internationella sjöfartsregler tydliggör att alla passagerare ska vara evakuerade 
inom 30 minuter efter att order getts om att överge fartyget. Utav de 3229 
passagerare och 1023 i besättningen som veterligen befann sig ombord vid tillfället 
omkom 32 människor. I takt med att kryssningsfartyg och övriga passagerarbåtar 
fortsätter att tillta i antal och storlek, så ökar även vikten av välfungerande 
utrymningsrutiner. 
 
Syftet med detta examensarbete har varit att kritiskt granska och analysera det 
allmänna material som finns att tillgå gällande mänskligt beteende under Costa 
Concordia-katastrofen – genom att studera såväl medias tolkningar, som 
vittnesuppgifter från överlevande och vetenskapliga utredningar etc. Målet har varit 
att försöka hitta beteendemönster som kan ha påverkat utrymningens effektivitet 
negativt, samt att identifiera potentiella svagheter i de nuvarande 
utrymningsrutinerna på passagerarfartyg. 
 
För att bli insatt i de nuvarande regelverken inom fartygsindustrin, och de 
vanligaste komplikationerna vid utrymning av passagerarbåtar, gjordes först en 
litteraturstudie. Därefter utvärderades de allmäntillgängliga uppgifterna om 
mänskligt beteende under Costa Concordia-katastrofen, med rådande teorier och 
modeller för mänskligt beteende vid utrymning i åtanke. En slutsats som dragits 
under arbetets gång är att modellerna är väl användbara för tolkningen av 
fartygsrelaterade evakueringskatastrofer. Det är också troligt att de kan bidra med 
värdefull information under ett planeringsstadium, för att förutspå människors 
beteende och handlingar vid olyckor ombord. 
 
Vidare uppdagades ett antal beteendemönster som kan ha bidragit till att reducera 
utrymningens effektivitet; 
 
• Förvirring 
• Frysning  
• Konkurrensbeteende (knuffar, trängsel etc.) 
• Osäkerhet och tvivel 
 
Flertalet organisatoriska fel och lednings-fel identifierades också som kan ha 
bidragit till att minska utrymningsprocedurernas effektivitet; 
 
• 696 passagerare hade vid grundstötningen ännu inte blivit instruerade om 
säkerhetsrutinerna, eftersom detta var schemalagt till dagen därpå. 
• Allmänheten, och merparten av besättningen, hölls ej informerade om 
situationens allvar, vilket hindrade dem från att förbereda sig mentalt på att 
evakuera. 
• Förseningen av uppsamlings- och evakueringsprocedurerna ledde till att 
dyrbar tid gick förlorad, vilket i sin tur gjorde att tidsramen för att sjösätta 
livbåtarna avsmalnade kraftigt. 
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• Bristande kommunikation mellan passagerare och besättning, samt 
besättningsmän emellan, berodde på såväl språkbarriärer som på 
motsägelsefulla order – vilket ledde till förvirring, frustration och 
missförstånd bland passagerarna. 
• Synbar avsaknad av utbildning och förståelse för utrymningsrutinerna 
orsakade misstro till ledarskapet hos passagerarna. 
 
För att förbättra säkerheten ombord på kryssningsfartyg och övriga passagerarbåtar 
föreslås att en ansträngning görs (utöver rådande regelverk) för att säkerställa att; 
 
• Passagerare ges tillräcklig information, dels innan en olycka inträffat, samt 
när den väl inträffar. 
• Personalen är väl insatt i säkerhetsrutiner och vet hur säkerhetsutrustning 
används, samt känner sig trygga i att använda den. 
• Personalen kan kommunicera med varandra såväl som med passagerarna. 
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Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms 
 
AIS – Automatic Tracking System 
Carabinieri – Italian National Military Police 
FCC – Fleet Crisis Coordinator 
IB – Investigative Body 
LSA – Life-Saving Appliance  
IMO – International Maritime Organization 
ISM Code – International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and 
for Pollution Prevention 
Martec system – Software that manages the controls for emergency breach and fire 
MRCC – Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
MRSC – Maritime Rescue Sub Center 
MSC – Maritime Safety Committee 
OSC – On Scene Commander 
RO-PAX – High-speed roll-on/roll-off ferry 
RO-RO – Roll-on/roll-off ferry 
SAR – Maritime Search and Rescue 
SOLAS – International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea  
SMS – Safety Management System 
STCW – International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
UCG – Coastal Guard Unit 
WTC – Watertight compartment  
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1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the background, aim and objectives, research questions, 
methodology, and delimitations of the thesis. 
1.1 Background 
Large-scale cruise ships and passenger ships have increased largely in popularity 
and numbers over the years, as a result so have also the number of maritime 
accidents with passenger ships involved. Several of the accidents have had fatal 
outcomes, just to mention a few; the Herald of Free Enterprise sank in March 1987, 
shortly after leaving the port of Zeebrugge in Belgium. The accident occurred 
because the bow door was left open as the ship left port – allowing water to enter 
and flood the car deck, resulting in the deaths of 193 passengers and crewmembers. 
In 1990 the Danish ship MS Scandinavian Star caught fire during a trip from 
Norway to Denmark, resulting in the loss of 165 lives. In 1992 a Royal Pacific 
cruise ship collided with a fishing trawler, resulting in 30 deaths and 70 injured. In 
September 1994 the RO-RO passenger ship MS Estonia capsized in a severe storm 
in the Baltic Sea and sank with the loss of 852 lives. In 2005 the Norwegian Dawn 
cruise ship was hit by a 20-meter wave that flooded 62 of the cabins. In December 
2014 the passenger ship Norman Atlantic caught fire on its route between Greece to 
Italy, 427 people were saved but 10 persons lost their lives. 
 
The Costa Concordia disaster represents one of the most dramatic ship evacuations 
of recent years. On 13 January 2012, the cruise ship struck a rock just off the eastern 
shore of Isola del Giglio, on the Italian west coast. The impact tore a 53 meter gash 
to the port side of the hull, which flooded parts of the engine room and caused 
power loss and damage to the ship’s electrical systems. Despite the fact that the ship 
was gradually sinking, an order to evacuate was not carried out until over an hour 
after the initial impact. International maritime law requires all passengers to be 
evacuated within 30 minutes of an order to abandon the ship, but the Costa 
Concordia evacuation took over six hours. Of the 3229 passengers and 1023 crew 
known to have been on board, 32 people drowned. 
 
As the cruise and passenger ships keep getting bigger, with higher passenger 
capacities, the importance of well-functioning evacuation procedures also increases. 
1.2 Aim and objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the data available from media on human 
behavior during the Costa Concordia disaster. The scope is to make a critical 
analysis of the information collected, and to perform an evaluation of the factors 
leading to issues in the evacuation procedures in light of current evacuation 
behavioral theories. This analysis will be used to identify the key issues occurring as 
well as potential improvements for evacuation procedures in ships. The aim of the 
thesis is: 
 
• To collect publicly available information on human behavior in the Costa 
Concordia disaster such as public information from the media, available 
accounts from survivors, public scientific studies and investigations. 
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• To categorize the behaviors of the passengers in light of evacuation 
behavioral theories. 
• To find possible behavioral factors which may have contributed in reducing 
the effectiveness of the evacuation procedures. 
• To identify potential issues in current evacuation procedures in ships as 
discussed in the IMO (international Maritime Organization) regulations in 
light of the issues occurring during the disaster. 
1.3 Research questions 
• How could the evacuation be more effective? 
• How can behavioral theories be used to interpret a ship evacuation disaster? 
• ‘Lessons learned’ – What commonly identified issues in the disaster can be 
used to improve safety in passenger ships (from both a regulatory and 
enforcement perspective). 
1.4 Methodology 
The method consists of a critical review of the publicly available information, such 
as the information from the media, available accounts from survivors, public 
scientific studies and investigations, etc. 
 
The next step is to present the current regulations and procedures in the passenger 
ship industry (as per the IMO, SOLAS documents etc.) and to give an introduction 
of some common complications in the evacuation procedures of large-scale 
passenger ships.  
 
Thereafter a study of different behavioral evacuation theories, such as social 
influence, affiliation, role rule, behavior sequence etc. will be carried out. 
 
In light of the various human evacuation behavioral theories, the information 
received from the previous research will be analyzed to address the research 
questions. 
1.5 Delimitations 
This thesis will focus on the human behavior aspects of the evacuation process 
only. No investigation of judgmental calls from the Captain or crewmembers prior 
to the accident will be carried out.  
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2 Theoretical: human evacuation behavior 
Over the past decades, there has been much research on human behavior in 
evacuation situations and a variety of theories and models have been developed to 
explain the reactions and behavior of evacuees. Most commonly the studies have 
been focusing on evacuation from building fires, however the same models and 
theories may be applied to describe the evacuation of a passenger ship.  
A cruise ship can merely be seen as a rather big floating building. Within this 
chapter, some of the models and theories for understanding human evacuation 
behavior are presented. A direct link to evacuation of passenger ships may not be 
clear, as these theories and models constitute the foundation for understanding 
human behavior in fire and evacuation in general.  
2.1 The behavior sequence model 
People do not necessarily evacuate at the first signs of a fire or emergency. In fact, 
time may be spent to interpret the first signs of the emergency, which then forms the 
basis of the decision making on how to act under the specific circumstances. 
 
By studying numerous cases of domestic, multiple occupancy, and hospital fires, 
Canter et al. (1980) developed the behavior sequence model to explain this process. 
After interviewing a total of 198 fire victims from 28 different fires, they found that 
there were characteristic patterns of behavior that occurred in all types of 
occupancies. With this in mind, Canter et al. (1980) proposed a general behavior 
sequence model (see Figure 1). The model can be described by the following three 
sequence categories, or so-called nodal points: 
 
1. Interpret 
2. Prepare 
3. Act 
 
Each nodal point forms a behavior sequence, e.g., a sequence of consecutive actions 
that people may perform. As the sequence of behavior unfolds, the number of 
potential actions increases. This means that statements about initial actions and 
behaviors are likely to be made with a higher degree of certainty than about actions 
later in the sequence. Canter et al. (1980) also concluded that actions in the lower 
part of Figure 1 are more likely to depend on the type of occupancy. 
 
Figure 1 The behavior sequence model is a general model that can be used to describe the sequence of 
consecutive actions that people perform in a fire, or other emergency situation.  
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It is to be noted that the behavior sequence model is merely a general model, and 
that it only summarizes the most frequent behaviors identified by Canter et al. 
(1980). It does not explain the specific behavior of each individual, and behavior 
sequences do not necessarily follow the arrows of Figure 1. Still, the model presents 
a valuable summary of the sequence categories that an individual may typically 
experience. 
 
The behavior sequence model can be used to describe why people in a passenger 
ship emergency do not necessarily start to evacuate at the first sign of danger. 
Typically, information is scarce and ambiguous at the initial stages of an 
emergency. An indication could, for example, be the smell of smoke. Such a vague 
signal is not very likely to immediately initiate an evacuation of a ship. It is more 
likely it will be ignored, or at best initiating an investigating behavior that can 
reduce the uncertainties about the situation.  
 
The initial decision making that a person does, at the early stages of an emergency 
situation, is most often associated with doubts and uncertainties (Canter et al., 
1980). As more information is received, the uncertainties associated with the 
decision-making are reduced. It is therefore more likely that a person will be able to 
correctly interpret, prepare, and act appropriately as more information is provided – 
especially if the information is comprehensible (Kuligowski, 2013). On the other 
hand, Kuligowski (2013) also points out that people may neglect taking protective 
action if the information is misinterpreted, or if provided with faulty information. 
2.2 The affiliative model  
Another model that can help the understanding of human behavior in fire, as well 
as other emergency situations, is the affiliative model developed by Sime (1983, 
1985). It was developed as a response to the so-called physical science model, as 
described by Phillips (1951) and Peschl (1971) amongst others. The physical science 
model equates people with “non-thinking objects” and assumes that people are 
most inclined to evacuate via the shortest exit route available (Sime J. , 1985). The 
affiliative model however suggests that people are more likely to move towards 
familiar places and/or people when they are in a threatening situation. In example, 
this means that in an emergency situation, people are more likely to use the same 
exit as they would use under normal circumstances or exit via the same route they 
entered a building. Subsequently, this also explains why people tend to avoid using 
special emergency exits, as these are generally not used under normal 
circumstances (Sime J. , 1985). 
 
The affiliative model also suggests that people are more likely to evacuate in groups 
where the individuals have previous bonds to each other, such as family members, 
friends, or colleagues. The fact that people in emergency situations tend to move to 
familiar persons has also showed to have an impact on the interpretation of 
ambiguous cues, and consequently, on the time it takes to evacuate. For example, 
Sime (1983) noticed that people that were separated from their family members 
seemed to respond very quickly to initial indications of fire. In contrast, people that 
are surrounded by their group when receiving the initial cues have shown to delay 
their decision to evacuate until there have been clear signs of a fire threat. A 
possible explanation for these two distinct outcomes may be that the initial 
indications of a fire (or other emergency) prompt individuals who are separated 
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from their group to go find them, even if the indications are vague. Individuals of 
complete groups may on the other hand gain a deceptive feeling of security for 
being part of their group. 
 
As passenger ships are unfamiliar environments to the majority of the people 
aboard, the affiliation model can be used to explain peoples’ hesitancy to evacuate. 
Obviously, unfamiliarity is not the only reason, and the behavior sequence model 
may provide additional reasons for this hesitancy. The affiliative model can also be 
used to explain why people aboard a passenger ship may form groups during an 
evacuation.  
2.3 Social influence 
As discussed in the previous sections, the presence of other people has shown to 
have an impact on an individual’s decision to evacuate. As an example of this 
phenomenon, it has been noticed that individuals that are alone respond much 
quicker to indications of fire compared to individuals that are part of a group 
(Latané & Darley, 1968). Nilsson and Johansson (2009) observed similar behavior 
patterns when carrying out unannounced evacuation experiments at a cinema 
theater. Their studies suggest that social influence is a factor of great importance 
when it comes to initial decision-making, and that it becomes even more important 
when the initial cue, e.g., the alarm, is unclear or uninformative. Similar 
observations have also been made by Kinateder (2013), Kinateder et al. (2014a), 
Kinateder et al. (2014b), and Lovreglio et al. (2015). Nilsson and Johansson (2009) 
further concluded that individuals seem to be more influenced by people who are 
close, compared to people farther away. 
 
Social influence can be divided into two sub-categories – normative social influence 
and informational social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Normative social 
influence is defined as an influence to “conform to the positive expectations of 
another” (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). In this context, positive expectations refer to 
expectations that lead to a positive feeling when fulfilled by another, e.g., the 
prevalent norms. People in general are afraid to deviate from the norms and 
therefore often adapt their individual judgments to the believed expectations of 
others. Informational social influence on the other hand is defined as an “influence 
to accept information obtained from others as evidence about reality” (Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955). In other words, this means that individuals look to other people for 
information in ambiguous situations, and when unsure of how to behave.  
In many emergency situations the information is scarce, especially during the initial 
stages, as of why social influence is very likely to affect the sequence of individual 
behaviors that unfolds. 
 
In the case of a passenger ship disaster, the effect of social influence can be both 
positive and negative. The normative aspect can constrain peoples’ response, and 
thereby delay the evacuation. As previously suggested, the affiliative model might 
explain peoples’ hesitancy to evacuate. This hesitancy is most likely intensified by 
the fact that using emergency exits and embarking into the lifeboats is not 
considered as the norm. On the other hand, informational social influence can have 
a positive effect if people see others evacuate or head for the muster stations. This is 
a strong signal that they themselves should also react, and it can evidently reduce 
   
6 
the initial uncertainties associated with the decision making, as illustrated in the 
behavior sequence model in Figure 1.  
2.4 The role-rule model 
Canter et al. (1980) demonstrated that behavior sequences, e.g., how a specific 
person responds to a fire, are greatly depending on the role of the person. When 
reviewing the general behavior sequence model, they found consistencies among 
the behavior of people from similar groups. For example, they discovered that in 
the case of hotel fires, staff behaved differently from the guests. The same 
tendencies were identified in hospital fires, where staff continued their duties to 
patients, and in residences, where parents ensured the safety of their children. It is 
clear that the behavior of people depend on the circumstantial role in which they 
see themselves (Pigott, 1989). 
 
Eventually the role-rule model was formed, suggesting that; “people's conduct is 
guided by a set of expectations they have about their purpose in a particular 
context” (Tong & Canter, 1985). These expectations set a general framework, 
which forms a person’s role. Each role is linked to a set of rules, which can be seen 
as guiding principles associated with the role that a person has adopted. Canter et 
al. (1980) argue that when a person is faced with a fire threat, his or her behavior 
continues to be guided by the role-rule influences, which had been operating prior 
to the emergency. 
 
In a fire, or other emergency situations aboard a passenger ship, contextual roles 
and associated rules can be expected to have an impact on the sequence of 
consecutive actions that people perform. Consequently, the authoritative personnel 
can be expected to interpret, prepare and act differently on cues of fire etc. 
compared to the passengers. 
2.5 The definition of ‘panic’ and its misconceptions 
The media, as well as surviving victims of disasters such as fires, shipwrecks, 
earthquakes, floodings etc., frequently use the term ‘panic’ to describe the events of 
a disaster. Despite plentiful evidence of panic being an exceptionally rare 
occurrence, the idea of panic and the term itself continue to be exaggeratedly used 
by the public as well as by experts (Fahy, Proulx, & Aiman, 2009). Furthermore, 
Roytman (1975) wrote that panic has often been thought of as something that could 
“spread among evacuees like a highly infectious decease”, and crowd behavior in 
disasters has often been referred to as ‘mass panic’ (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 
2009a). 
 
To clarify the term ‘panic’, Fahy et al. (2009) made a thorough study on its various 
definitions, as well as a case study to examine the concept from the view of the 
general public and media. Goldenson (1984) defined panic as “a reaction involving 
terror, confusion and irrational behavior, precipitated by a threatening situation”. 
He further described panic as “a collective flight based on a hysterical belief, a belief 
that a definite threat is present and that escape routes are closing”. Based on 
Goldenson’s definition, Johnson (1987) suggested that it’s better to use the term 
‘unregulated competition’ as a descriptive label when relating to the behavior of 
disaster evacuees. His argument was that although the behavior can become highly 
selfish and aggressive, it is not as a result of irrational panic, but rather of the 
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emergent definitions of the situation in which norms of civility no longer apply, and 
to compete for individual advantage is therefore legitimate and also quite rational. 
Keating (1982) outlined four elements of panic, namely: a) hope to escape through 
dwindling resources; b) contagious behavior; c) aggressive concern about one's own 
safety; and d) irrational, illogical responses. Quarantelli (1954) describe panic as an 
acute reaction of fear, distinguished by flight behavior, and the panicking person as 
irrational in his or her flight behavior. However, flight behavior in general is not to 
be confused with panic, as flight behavior itself can be rational in a disaster 
situation. This was also pointed out by Wenger (1978), who suggested that it is 
rather non-adaptive flight as a form of mass behavior that should be considered as 
panic. His conditions for panic also include; a) when danger is perceived as a 
specific threat and this results in a social crisis, b) only one or limited escape routes 
exist, c) people believe that escape is possible, d) people believe that competition 
rather than cooperation is necessary for escape, and e) there is a lack of ties to other 
individuals.  
 
Fahy et al. (2009) found that in most of the literature on human behavior, panic is 
defined as some sort of irrational behavior. They also noted that human behavior 
under stressed situations, such as disasters, is usually relatively controlled, rational 
and adaptive. Furthermore they found that cooperation is predominant to selfish 
behavior, even among total strangers. However, panic is often reported when 
people observe the behavior of others, if it leads to an unsuccessful outcome. The 
term is also widely misused when people describe their own state of intensified 
anxiety or fear, although the actions they report taking themselves are typically 
both rational and appropriate (Fahy, Proulx, & Aiman, 2009). Similar findings 
have also been done by (Cocking & Drury, 2014). 
 
Critique towards the concept of 'mass panic' has grown from the observations that 
crowd behavior in emergencies is typically characterized by sociality and solidarity 
rather than by individualized competition (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 2009a). In an 
attempt to explain some of the aspects of crowd behavior in emergencies, Drury et 
al. (2009a) followed the self-categorization theory as they interviewed 21 survivors 
from 11 disasters involving crowd evacuation. The theory can be used to determine 
a person’s level of group-identification (Turner et al., 1987). The aim of the study 
was to compare high- versus low- identification survivors. The results of the study 
suggest that “shared identity in an emergency crowd enhances expressions of 
solidarity and reduces 'panic' behavior and that such a shared identity can arise 
from the shared experience of the emergency itself” (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 
2009a). They study also showed that high-identification survivors saw, received, 
and gave more aid to others, compared to those of low group identification. Drury 
et al (2009a) further concluded that panic is rather a feature of individuals, not of 
crowds, and that the mass sociality observed in emergencies is a consequence of 
shared self-categorization rather than a function of pre-existing social bonds.  
The findings of this study are further strengthened by the studies of Drury et al., 
(2009b), which also suggests that competitive behavior, such as pushing, is more 
likely to be adopted by people of low group identification. In addition, it was also 
noticed that pushing increased as the size of the crowd increased. However, people 
may push more in larger crowds simply because of physical constraints, rather than 
personal selfishness (Chertkoff & Kushigian, 1999; Cornwell, Harmon, Mason, 
Merz, & Lampe, 2001). 
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Sime (1990) pointed out that one major problem with using the term panic is that 
“panic behavior is often attributed to a person by an ’observer,’ while the person 
supposedly engaged in the panic behavior has a very different perspective on what 
occurred”. Furthermore, Brennan (1999) discovered several cases with substantial 
discrepancies in reported behavior between people that were present at the same 
event – in these cases, each person had a rational explanation for his or her own 
behavior, while that same behavior had appeared irrational or panicky to others.  
 
As previously suggested, panic is also frequently referred to in the media’s covering 
of various disasters. There are for example many cases in the reporting of mass-
casualty events, where the media has proclaimed that the cause of the deaths was 
panic (Fahy, Proulx, & Aiman, 2009). Fahy et al. (2009) concluded that; “panic 
will remain a concern of the public as long as the term continues to be used 
frequently in media accounts, reinforcing the impression that it is a common and 
possibly inevitable occurrence”. They therefore suggest that the media needs to take 
a greater responsibility in making accurate reports of peoples’ behavior; this also 
applies to many human behavior scientists. 
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3 Regulations and procedures 
Passenger ships and RO-RO ferries today are subject to a vast array of regulations 
and standards. The aim of this chapter is to give a brief introduction to some of the 
current regulations and procedures in the passenger ship industry. 
3.1 IMO 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialized agency of the 
United Nations, established to act as a global standard-setting authority for the 
safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping. 
“Its main role is to create a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is 
fair and effective, universally adopted and universally implemented” (IMO, 2014a). 
 
When the IMO convention was gathered for the first time in 1959, one of its first 
tasks was to update the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), which is widely regarded as the most important of all treaties concerning 
maritime safety (IMO, 2014b). The earliest version of SOLAS was adopted in 1914 
as a response to the Titanic disaster and has been updated continuously ever since. 
The 1974 version of SOLAS includes a tacit acceptance procedure – which is why 
the Convention in force today is often referred to as SOLAS, 1974, as amended 
(IMO, 2014b).  
 
In response to a series of incidents at sea between the late 80’s and the beginning of 
the 90’s, the IMO adopted a series of amendments to the SOLAS, including those 
relating to fire safety measures (such as escape routes and fire protection systems), 
life-saving appliances and arrangements, stability regulations, as well as operational 
requirements such as that for an established working language (IMO, 2014c). 
Besides making improvements to the technical regulations of the SOLAS 
Convention, the IMO also introduced the ISM Code for passenger ships, which has 
been an important step in focusing on the "human element" side of shipping, as well 
as the STCW Convention, which sets the standards of competence for seafarers 
internationally (IMO, 2014c). 
 
Apart from the aforementioned codes and regulations, the IMO has also established 
international collision regulations and international conventions and codes relating 
to search and rescue etc. (IMO, 2014b). Recently the IMO has also recognized the 
need to focus on the ferries that do not come under SOLAS. They are therefore 
currently working on the development of standards for "non-convention" vessels 
(e.g. the passenger ferries that for reasons of being operated inland or solely on 
domestic routes are not required to conform with SOLAS) (IMO, 2014d). 
3.2 SOLAS 
The main purpose of the SOLAS Convention is to “specify minimum standards for 
the construction, equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their safety” 
(IMO, 2014b). Within the documents it is also specified how, and by whom, 
inspections are to be carried out to ensure that all ships comply with the regulations 
and requirements, as applicable. The SOLAS Convention includes a set of Articles 
that specify the general obligations, the terms for the amendment procedure and so 
on, followed by an Annex of 12 Chapters.  
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It is not within the scope of this thesis to analyze and recapture the entire content of 
the SOLAS Convention. However, a few extracts from some of the regulations that 
apply to passenger ships and RO-RO ferries are presented briefly below to make 
some examples (note that the regulations below are as of 2014, hence why Ch. III, 
regulation 19.2.2 is not up to date). 
 
Chapter II-2 gives detailed specifications for the fire safety provisions, including; 
construction of firecells, fire detection, containment of fire and fire extinction, 
notification of crew and passengers, means of egress, etc. For example; 
 
Chapter II-2, Regulation 12 – Notification of crew and passengers 
1. The purpose of this regulation is to notify crew and passengers of a fire for safe 
evacuation. For this purpose, a general emergency alarm system and a public 
address system shall be provided. 
2. A general emergency alarm system required by regulation III/6.4.2 shall be 
used for notifying crew and passengers of a fire. 
3. A public address system or other effective means of communication complying 
with the requirements of regulation III/6.5 shall be available throughout the 
accommodation and service spaces and control stations and open decks. 
 
Chapter II-2, Regulation 13 – Means of escape 
1. The purpose of this regulation is to provide means of escape so that persons on 
board can safely and swiftly escape to the lifeboat and liferaft embarkation deck. 
For this purpose, the following functional requirements shall be met: 
1.1. safe escape routes shall be provided; 
1.2. escape routes shall be maintained in a safe condition, clear of obstacles; and 
1.3. additional aids for escape shall be provided as necessary to ensure 
accessibility, clear marking, and adequate design for emergency situations. 
2. General requirements 
2.1. Unless expressly provided otherwise in this regulation, at least two widely 
separated and ready means of escape shall be provided from all spaces or 
groups of spaces. 
2.2. Lifts shall not be considered as forming one of the means of escape as 
required by this regulation. 
 
Chapter III deals with the requirements for life-saving appliances and arrangements 
such as; lifeboats, rescue boats, lifejackets, muster list and emergency instructions, 
manning and supervision of survival crafts, emergency drills, abandon ship drill, 
etc. For example; 
 
Chapter III, Regulation 10 – Manning of survival craft and supervision 
1. This regulation applies to all ships. 
2. There shall be a sufficient number of trained persons on board for mustering and 
assisting untrained persons. 
3. There shall be a sufficient number of crew members, who may be deck officers 
or certificated persons, on board for operating the survival craft and launching 
arrangements required for abandonment by the total number of persons on 
board. 
4. A deck officer or certificated person shall be placed in charge of each survival 
craft to be used. However, the Administration, having due regard to the nature 
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of the voyage, the number of persons on board and the characteristics of the 
ship, may permit persons practiced in the handling and operation of liferafts to 
be placed in charge of liferafts in lieu of persons qualified as above. A second-in-
command shall also be nominated in the case of lifeboats. 
5. The person in charge of the survival craft shall have a list of the survival craft 
crew and shall see that the crew under his command are acquainted with their 
duties. In lifeboats the second-in-command shall also have a list of the lifeboat 
crew. 
6. Every motorized survival craft shall have a person assigned who is capable of 
operating the engine and carrying out minor adjustments. 
7. The master shall ensure the equitable distribution of persons referred to in 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 among the ship’s survival craft. 
 
Chapter III, Regulation 19 – Emergency training and drills 
1. This regulation applies to all ships. 
2. Familiarity with safety installations and practice musters 
2.1. Every crew member with assigned emergency duties shall be familiar with 
these duties before the voyage begins. 
2.2. On a ship engaged on a voyage where passengers are scheduled to be on 
board for more than 24 h, musters of the passengers shall take place within 
24 h after their embarkation. Passengers shall be instructed in the use of the 
lifejackets and the action to take in an emergency. 
 
Regulation XI-2/8 of Chapter XI confirms the Master’s role of exercising his 
professional judgments over decisions necessary to maintain the security of the 
ship. It says he shall not be constrained by the Company, the charterer or any other 
person in this matter. 
 
(IMO, 1974) 
3.3 LSA code 
The Maritime Safety Committee adopted the International Life-Saving Appliances 
(LSA) Code in 1996. It provides additional information of the international 
requirements for the life-saving appliances that are required by chapter III of the 
SOLAS Convention, including: personal life-saving appliances, visual aids, survival 
crafts, rescue boats, launching and embarkation appliances, general alarm and 
public address systems, etc. (Witherby Seamanship International, 2010).  
3.4 ISM Code 
Management faults were sometimes identified amongst the contributing factors to 
some of the serious passenger ship accidents that occurred during the late 1980’s. In 
1989 the IMO adopted Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation of Ships 
and for Pollution Prevention, which purpose was to provide the seafarers with a 
“framework for the proper development, implementation and assessment of safety 
and pollution prevention management in accordance with good practice” (IMO, 
2014d). After four years of experience in using these guidelines, the International 
Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention 
(the ISM Code) was adopted, and in 1994 the IMO made amendments to the 
SOLAS to make the ISM Code mandatory. 
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The ISM Code determines the safety-management objectives and it is required that 
the Company (e.g. the ship owner, or any person who has assumed responsibility 
for operating a ship) establishes a safety management system (SMS). Furthermore 
the Company is required to establish and implement a policy for reaching these 
objectives, which includes the provision of necessary resources and shore-based 
support. “Every company is expected ‘to designate a person or persons ashore 
having direct access to the highest level of management’“ (IMO, 2014d). The ISM 
Code also requires obligatory procedures to be documented and assembled in a 
Safety Management Manual, of which a copy must always be kept onboard.  
3.5 STCW Convention 
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch 
keeping for Seafarers sets the standards of competence for seafarers internationally. 
It includes the specific training requirements for all crewmembers on passenger 
ships and RO-RO ferries. In example, it specifies how the crew should be trained in 
crowd management, for use in emergency evacuation situations etc. The STCW 
Convention also empowers the IMO to check for Parties’ compliance with the 
Convention. This is important as there are reportedly many unqualified seafarers 
holding fraudulent certificates within the shipping industry, being a danger not only 
to themselves but also to others onboard and to the marine environment (IMO, 
2014e). 
3.6 Response to the Costa Concordia incident 
A few months after the Costa Concordia incident, the IMO’s Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) agreed on temporary recommendations in operational measures 
for passenger ships. In June 2013 the MSC amended the SOLAS regulations to 
require all passengers to undergo a mandatory muster drill prior to or immediately 
upon departure, instead of within 24 hours, as stated in the previous regulations. 
This amendment went into force in January 2015. The MSC also updated the long-
term action plan and the short-term measures to include recommendations relating 
to; bridge navigational procedures, securing of heavy objects, stowage of lifejackets, 
extended use of video for passenger emergency instruction notices, etc. (IMO, 
2016). 
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4 General review of passenger ship evacuation issues 
This chapter will give an introduction to some of the most common complications 
in the evacuation procedures of large-scale passenger ships. 
4.1 Effects of pitching, rolling and incline 
Walking speed is an important factor during evacuation (Gwynne & Boyce, 2016). 
Research teams from all around the world have tried to find correlations between 
ship-motions, trim, heeling, and the walking speeds of evacuees (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Heel and trim can be related to as more or less “static” conditions of incline while rolling and 
pitching are “dynamic” in terms of a back-and-forth rocking motion. 
The studies of Katuhara et al. (1998,1999) describe a research project by the 
National Maritime Research Institute of Japan that was launched to determine the 
walking speeds of evacuees. Experiments were carried out during a 3-year period at 
a ship docked at harbor. The subjects of the experiments were students of 20 years 
age, in groups of 70-120 persons. By filming the subjects as they moved along a pre-
defined evacuation path, the results of the research showed that the average 
movement speeds of the evacuees were 1.4 meters per second along corridors and 
0.7 meters per second for stairs.  
 
The Research Institute of Marine Engineering of Japan has studied the effects of 
incline as well as pitching and rolling (Yoshida et al., 2000, 2001). In their 
experiments a total of 20 male and female adults were clocked as they walked 
through a corridor. The corridor itself was constructed to simulate inclines of up to 
20o. For the rolling and pitching experiments, motion cycles of 5 seconds and 10 
seconds were simulated, with a maximum incline of 10o. The results of the 
experiments showed that with no incline, the average walking speed was roughly 
1.25 meters per second. For the trim scenarios, the walking speeds varied between 
0.82 to 1.38 meters per second – the speed decreasing as the upward trim increased. 
However, the experiments showed that static heeling up to 20o had insignificant 
effects on the walking speed. As for the rolling and pitching experiments, the 
walking speeds decreased by roughly 20% compared to the stationary conditions.  
 
The works of Koss et al. (1997) describes experiments carried out by the Australian 
Maritime Engineering-Cooperative Research Center (AMEC RC). The 67 
participants were males and females in the ages of 18-25. They recorded an average 
walking speed of 1.65 meters per second for the scenarios without any incline. For 
downward trim, the walking speed increased as the trim angle increased. For the 
upward trim and heeling scenarios they found no significant changes in walking 
speed. However, the studies of Brumley & Koss (2000) showed that listing made a 
significant decrease in walking speed for people with walking disabilities and for the 
group of test persons of age 65 and above.  
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The studies of Bles et al. (2001) describe yet another research-project that was 
launched to determine how listing and ship motions affect walking speeds along 
corridors and in stairs. TNO Human Factors in the Netherlands built a ship motion 
simulator – a 4.0 m x 2.4 m x 2.3 m sized cabin, placed on a hydraulic pump. A 
total of 150 subjects in the ages of 18-83 participated in the experiments. For the 
scenarios without any incline, the recorded average walking speed was 1.32 meters 
per second along corridors. Upward trim resulted in an average decrease in walking 
speed of 35%, while downward trim and heeling conditions had insignificant 
impact. For the pitching and rolling scenarios, there was a 15% decrease in speed. 
In the scenarios where the subjects had to walk stairs, an average walking speed of 
0.48 meters per second was recorded under normal conditions – upward trim 
resulted in a 40% decrease in speed, while downward trim resulted in a 30% 
decrease. Once again heeling showed no significant impact. 
It was also shown that the people in the age group of 60 years and above were 
roughly 15% slower than the rest of the subjects in most scenarios. 
 
Experimental research similar to the ones mentioned above has also been done at 
the SHEBA facility by Glen et al. (2003), with similar finings and conclusions.  
 
Due to concerns of safety of the participants, no experiments have examined the 
effects of incline above 20o. Although most experiments has shown that heeling of 
up to 20o has insignificant impact on walking speed (for people without walking 
disabilities), it is plausible to believe that greater heeling will. In addition to having 
an impact on walking speeds, heavy listing can obviously cause furniture, luggage 
and other loose items to slide out of place, thereby blocking passages and making 
the accessibility more problematic. Heavy listing also causes problems in the 
launching of lifeboats and liferafts, as reported in the case of the Costa Concordia 
grounding amongst other accidents (RINA, 2016). 
4.2 Crowd density 
Most of the aforementioned experiments on walking speeds do not take into 
account the effects associated with crowds. In emergency situations, it is sometimes 
reported that evacuees show tendencies of one or more of the following behavior 
patterns (Helbing, Farkas, & Tamás, 2000). 
 
• People move (or try to move) faster than they would do under normal 
circumstances. 
• Some individuals start pushing, and interactions among people become 
physical. 
• Moving, and in particular passing of bottlenecks, becomes uncoordinated. 
• Fallen or injured people further slow the egress by acting as obstacles. 
• People show a tendency of mass behavior, e.g. they adapt the behavior of 
the surrounding people. 
 
There are a few experiments on crowd movement in ship evacuations. According to 
the AMEC RC’s experiments described by Koss et al. (1997) the crowd movement 
speed was measured as 1.32 meters per second for the front of the group, 1.10 
meters per second for the middle, and 0.80 meters per second for the tail. They also 
noticed that as two groups from opposite directions met, the speed decreased by 
roughly 50%. For two groups that first walked parallel to each other and then 
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merged, the decrease in speed was measured to 20%. Furthermore, the Research 
Institute of Marine Engineering of Japan found that the crowd movement speed 
decreased as the width of corridors decreased (Yoshida et al., 2000, 2001). In 
addition, they found that walking as a crowd was 20–55% slower than walking 
alone. 
 
The Korea Research Institute of Ships and Ocean Engineering studied crowd 
movement combined with the effects of ship movement and listing (Lee, Park, & 
Kim, 2004). For their experiments they built a model of a corridor measuring 10 x 
1.2 x 1.9 meters, ending in a set of stairs. The model was constructed to simulate 
trim angles of -20o to 20o and/or heel angles of 0o to 20o. All experiments were 
carried out twice – once with, and once without the impact of ship motion. For the 
ship motion experiments, the whole model was placed aboard a ship and 
experiments were carried out while the ship was sailing. 
The results of their study show that the crowd movement speed was roughly 20% 
slower compared to the individual movement speed. Substantial decrease in speed 
was also observed for groups walking in the presence of either trim or heel. When 
groups of people walking from opposite directions met, there was a significant 
decrease in speed, especially at the tails of the groups (the walking speed reduction 
by counter-flow was 30-60%). The presence of ship motions further slowed the 
egress speed by 10-20%. 
4.3 Behaviors of people 
When disaster strikes, people may react in widely different ways. Leach (1994) 
suggests that in severe emergencies, only about 10 to 25 percent of people are able 
to undertake prompt and effective actions. Between 65 to 80 percent of disaster 
victims are more likely to become indecisive and act in a stunned or bewildered 
manner. The remaining 10 to 15 percent of victims may display serious 
maladaptive behaviors such as confusion, crying, paralyzing, anxiety, or even 
hysteria. This, of course, all depends on the nature of the disaster; under less 
stressed circumstances the likeliness of calm and orderly responses is obviously 
much higher compared to situations where time and resources are scarce 
(Robinson, 2012).  
4.3.1 Denial 
One of the reasons people fail to act appropriately in emergency situations is that 
some enter a state of denial. “Past experiences of false alarms or inaccurate disaster 
warnings can lead people, quite rationally, to believe actions are not really needed” 
(Robinson, 2012). The reliability of the source from which the disaster warnings are 
coming is also of importance – if people don’t trust the source, denial is more likely. 
Another contributing reason for denial is that humans are highly social creatures 
(Robinson, 2012). The deeply rooted desire to not deviate from the norm can 
sometimes make people ignore any warning signs if no one else is reacting upon it 
(a form of normative social influence). 
4.3.2 Freezing 
Cognitive paralysis or “freezing” can be observed among people facing disasters 
(Leach, 2004). In our daily life, humans have a set of pre-planned behavior schemes 
that we apply for various everyday-situations without much contemplation – given 
enough time it is also feasible to create new behaviors suitable for most situations 
(Robinson, 2012). However, when under threat or time-pressure, creating new 
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behaviors becomes more difficult and may thus result in what we refer to as 
freezing – leaving a person seemingly paralyzed (Leach, 2005). 
4.3.3 Stereotypical behaviors 
It also happens that people facing disasters are able to avoid freezing by engaging 
their pre-existing behavior schemes. Although it is less cognitively demanding to 
use the pre-existing behavior schemes, it may sometimes result in some less than 
ideal behaviors (Robinson, 2012). One example of stereotypical behavior is when 
people use their normal every-day exit route or the entrance from which they came 
in, instead of using the designated emergency exits, even if it means they must walk 
a longer distance or possibly even pass several emergency exits on their way. This 
behavior could also be explained using the affiliative model by Sime (1983,1985). 
4.3.4 Inappropriate behaviors 
In addition to freezing and stereotypical behaviors, people facing disasters also tend 
to make poor decisions that can lead to inappropriate actions (Robinson, 2012). 
Experimental studies have shown that the combination of time pressure and vague 
or unclear information is likely to cause errors in people’s judgment (Ariely & 
Zakay, 2001). 
4.3.5 Memory failures 
Victims of disasters often report of memory failures (Robinson, 2012). There are 
several theories as of why memory problems are caused during pressured situations 
– one being that the body releases high levels of cortisol hormone, which can affect 
the memory processing (Robinson, 2012). Regardless of the specific reason behind 
it, it is obvious that memory failures during disaster situations can cause victims to 
forget how to follow emergency procedures or how to use specific emergency 
equipment (Robinson, Sünram-Lea, Leach, & Owen-Lynch, 2008). 
4.4 Assembling people 
The evacuation of large-scale passenger ships and Ro-Ro ferries usually comprise a 
two-stage procedure, with an assembly and an abandonment phase. The assembly 
phase commences as the general emergency alarm is raised, and passengers are 
instructed to assemble at their muster stations. Depending on the procedures of the 
specific ship operators, the passengers will either have to collect their lifejackets 
from their cabins, or otherwise receive them at the muster stations. Normally, crew 
will be stationed in staircases and in corridors on all decks to guide the passengers, 
and if necessary, search all areas of the ship for passengers. The Royal Institution of 
Naval Architects suggests that for a ship the size of Costa Concordia, the assembly 
phase could take 40-60 minutes (RINA, 2016).  
 
The total assembly time highly depends on a number of factors, such as; response 
time of the passengers, wayfinding, behavior of people, walking speeds, etc., etc. 
 
As part of the so-called SAFEGUARD project, Galea et al. (2014a, 2014b) has 
carried out a series of semi-unannounced full-scale assembly trials at various types 
of large passenger ships in order to collect validation data-sets for ship evacuation 
software tools such as maritimeEXODUS, i.e. Using IR beacons and tags as well as 
video cameras, Galea et al. (2014a, 2014b) were able to collect useful information 
regarding the response times of the passengers. The results from two of the 
experiments are presented below. 
   
17 
 
The first assembly trial took place on a large RO-PAX ferry operated by ColorLine 
AS, called SuperSpeed 1.The vessel has a capacity to carry approximately 2000 
passengers and crew and over 700 vehicles. The assembly trial was carried out on 
the vessel’s route from Larvik in Norway to Hirtshals in Denmark, a trip of 3 hours 
and 45 minutes. At the day of the experiment there were a total of 1349 passengers 
aboard – out of which 780 wore IR tags and were, thus, registered by the IR 
beacons. Response times were registered between 0 and 402.4 seconds, with a mean 
response time of 35.80 seconds and a standard deviation of 2.65 seconds (Galea, 
Deere, Brown, & Filippidis, 2014a). 
 
The second assembly trial took place aboard a Royal Caribbean cruise ship with a 
capacity to carry approximately 2500 passengers and 842 crew. Data was collected 
on the vessel while it was cruising in the Baltic Sea, between Harwich in the UK 
and Copenhagen in Denmark. The trial involved some 2292 passengers, out of 
which 1779 wore tags and were thus tracked throughout the trial. Response times 
were registered between 0 seconds and 1379 seconds, with a mean response time of 
150.20 seconds and a standard deviation of 2.44 seconds (Galea, Deere, Brown, & 
Filippidis, 2014b). 
4.5 Wayfinding 
“A passenger ship can be a labyrinth for people staying onboard. Contrary to 
crewmembers, passengers are not familiarized with the arrangement of corridors 
and spaces within the ship” (Lozowicka, 2006). Lozowicka highlights the 
importance of proper lighting and signage of evacuation routes. As emergency 
situations can be accompanied by power outage and/or the presence of smoke, it is 
essential that information about direction of escape is clear and easy to find. 
Without an emergency way-finding system the potential for slips, falls, injury or 
fatalities becomes greatly increased, she says. However, as May (2004) points out, 
“the primary assistance to passengers is given by human agents who have been 
trained in emergency procedures and evacuation of passengers”. This statement is 
further strengthened by the experiments of Yoshida et al. (2001). May (2004) also 
explains that a person under stress can easily be confused and misinterpret the 
various meanings of the evacuation signs. He further implies that the typical ‘you-
are-here’ maps are not very useful under evacuation situations, as these require 
more time to analyze and interpret. 
4.6 Disembarking 
The abandonment phase begins when the Master gives the abandon ship order. The 
current SOLAS regulations specify that it should take 30 minutes maximum, to 
prepare and launch the lifeboats and life rafts from a passenger ship once the 
passengers are actually assembled. If necessary, the abandonment phase can even 
start before all passengers have assembled (RINA, 2016). The launching of lifeboats 
may very well be one of the most critical phases of an evacuation.  
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5 Case study 
Accounts of what happened on the night of the Costa Concordia grounding are 
plenteous in numbers, however there is some divergence amongst them. In order to 
get a better understanding of the accident, first a brief summary of the various 
media channels’ reports is introduced, followed by an analysis of video recordings 
from the accident. Thereafter, accounts from survivors are presented, and finally – 
the results from scientific studies and investigations.  
5.1 Media’s interpretation 
Immediately after the grounding, media started reporting worldwide of the ‘Costa 
Concordia disaster’. The reports from the earlier broadcasts and newspapers, e.g. 
from the first couple of days after the grounding, vary the most. For example, there 
are several conflicting accounts as of at what time the ship hit the underwater reef; 
around 8 pm (International Business Times, 2012), 9.30 pm (news.com.au, 2012), 
9.44 pm (Financial Times, 2012), etc. Different sources also claim various size of 
the gash on the portside hull, ranging anywhere between 45 meters (Sky News, 
2012) up to 100 meters (Discovery News, 2012). There were also a number of 
different suggestions regarding how many passengers and crew that were aboard 
the cruiser at the time of the incident. However, one feature that a majority of the 
media coverage had in common was the emphasis on scenes of ‘panic’ and ‘chaos’. 
The examples below are just a few of the headlines and ingress quotes that could be 
read in newspapers in the days following the Costa Concordia grounding. 
 
”One hour of panic on stricken cruise liner Costa Concordia”  
(Mirror, 2012) 
 
”Costa Concordia Disaster Videos: Amateur Footage Shows Passenger Evacuation, Panic” 
(The World Post, 2012) 
 
”The ship’s doctor on the Costa Concordia cruise liner has described scenes of panic and chaos 
as he helped dozens of terrified passengers clamber into lifeboats as the vessel keeled over.” 
(The Telegraph, 2012) 
 
”Passengers tell of 'chaos' as crew members said 'go back to your cabins'” 
(Daily Mail, 2012) 
 
”There were scenes of panic as the Costa Concordia hit a sandbar on Friday evening…” 
(BBC, 2012) 
 
”Passenger videos show panic after wreck of Costa Concordia cruise ship…” 
(Daily News, 2012) 
 
In the months following the accident, the media mainly focused on updating the 
rising death count, and on publishing passengers’ stories (which will be further 
presented in Section 5.3), as well as speculating on theories regarding the Captain’s 
maneuvering and actions after the initial impact.  
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The following photos show the cruise ship Costa Concordia, as it lies docked at 
harbor (Figure 3), and after the capsizing, as the search and rescue operation is set 
in motion (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 3 The Costa Concordia cruise ship (image retrieved from Wikimedia Commons, photo: Cezary 
Piwowarski) 
 
Figure 4 The Costa Concordia after it is severely listed (image retrieved from Wikimedia Commons, photo: 
Roberto Vongher) 
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The photos below were taken on the 14th of January 2012, Figure 5 illustrating the 
continued search and rescue operations, and Figure 6 showing the 53 meter rift as 
well as the rock embedded within the portside of the hull. 
 
 
Figure 5 The lifeboats have reached the port of Isla Giglio while rescue teams are still searching onboard 
the ship (image retrieved from Wikimedia Commons, photo: Roberto Vongher) 
 
Figure 6 The impact with the reef tore a 53-meter long hole to the portside of the hull. A big rock was 
detached from the reef and got stuck in the hull of the vessel (image retrieved from Wikimedia Commons, 
photo: Roberto Vongher)  
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5.2 Observations made from video- and mobile phone recordings 
There is a variety of video footage from the Costa Concordia disaster to be found 
on You-tube and other online media channels, filmed by passengers and crew 
utilizing mobile phones and amateur camcorders. However there is also a wide 
range of  “fake” video footage circulating – claiming to be recordings from the 
Costa Concordia grounding – that are essentially filmed in entirely different 
situations. It has therefore been of uttermost importance to verify the sources the 
video recordings in order to sort out irrelevant material. 
 
On the 11th of April 2012, the British Channel 4 broadcasted a documentary called 
The Sinking of Costa Concordia: Caught on Camera. The documentary includes a 
thorough compilation of private video recordings supplied by passengers and crew.  
Conveniently the editors of the documentary have made great effort to align the 
video footage in consecutive order and to provide accurate time of events, allowing 
to get a better understanding of the different phases of the disaster. In addition to 
the private recordings, the documentary also includes some video material supplied 
by the coast guard and rescue divers. 
 
The Channel 4 documentary has formed the basis for the video analysis of this 
thesis, as nearly all of the elsewhere retrieved video recordings are included therein. 
The observations therefore refer to The Sinking of Costa Concordia: Caught on Camera 
(Cheslin-Nuttall, o.a., 2012). Comments on the various behaviors observed are 
presented in the tables below. 
 
In order to better understand the characteristics of the different phases of the 
evacuation, comments have been categorized into behaviors observed and divided 
into groups corresponding to the sequences described. 
 
Initial sequence (approx. 21:45 – 22:33) 
- The time between the first impact until the general emergency alarm is raised. 
Behaviors Observations from video recordings 
Confusion 
Immediately after the impact there is great confusion amongst the people 
onboard, neither passengers nor crew knows what is happening. 
 
Yelling, 
shouting 
There is an initial state of turmoil and some people are yelling and 
shouting. 
 
Anxiety 
At first most people seem very anxious and leave their seats in the 
restaurants to head for the nearest exits. 
Hesitancy, 
indecisiveness 
Immediately after the impact, the waiters and staff are trying to calm the 
passengers, but they seem insecure of how to handle the situation and 
are giving conflicting orders. Some suggest that it is best to just sit down 
and wait, while others are urging the passengers to proceed to the exits. 
 
Crying 
There are young children crying as plates and glasses are falling to the 
floor, asking their parents what is going on. 
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Calming, 
soothing 
Parents are acting calm, trying to sooth their crying children and say that 
there is nothing to worry about and that everything will be fine, 
proposing that it is just a matter of a broken engine.  
 
Calm 
A public announcement is made, stating there is a power outage and the 
public is ensured that the situation is under control. Thereafter, the 
majority of people are acting relatively calm, although many are still 
skeptic. Some of the kitchen staff and waiters are cleaning up the mess in 
the restaurants as if the order would soon go back to normal. 
 
Humor 
As people are leaving the restaurants, a few are jokingly saying that they 
hope the cruise company will pay for their wine bills, others are heading 
for the bar to ask if it is still open for business.  
 
Leadership 
Crewmembers are urging the passengers to stay calm and ensuring that 
the situation is under control. After a while the passengers are asked to 
return to their cabins or to sit down in any of the public lounges. 
 
Skepticism 
Some passengers are questioning how the ship can be listing, presumably 
“only” due to a technical fault and ask why the crewmembers are 
wearing lifejackets since they claim everything is under control. 
 
As the listing of the ship increases, more and more people gather by the 
muster stations. There are obvious difficulties in walking normally along 
the tilted corridors. 
 
A recording filmed on the bridge reveals a conversation about passengers 
trying to enter the lifeboats on their own, despite the instructions from 
the crew. 
 
 
Main evacuation sequence (approx. 22:33 – 00:00) 
- The time after the general emergency alarm until the lifeboats on the portside of the ship 
can no longer be launched due to the listing. 
Behaviors Observations from video recordings 
Stress 
When the general emergency alarm is eventually announced, the people 
that are not already gathered at the muster stations hurry to get their 
lifejackets and rush to the muster stations as they realize the situation is 
worse than previously assumed. 
 
Anxiety 
The passengers at the muster stations look worried and many are quiet 
and anxious. 
 
Humor 
Some crew and passengers are trying to keep the spirit up and are 
making jokes and filming each other as they are balancing back and forth 
across the tilted deck to pass the time. 
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Calm 
Although there is a mixed state of mind aboard the ship and many are 
scared, the majority of people are acting calm as they are waiting for 
further instructions. 
 
Competitive 
behavior 
(pushing, 
elbowing, 
squeezing)  
When the crew finally allows passengers to enter the lifeboats, turmoil 
breaks out as some are trying to push and elbow their way forward to get 
aboard the lifeboats. Some of the people that are being squeezed and 
pushed are upset and there is screaming and shouting. 
Goodwill 
Old people with walking disabilities and families with young children 
are given priority by most and are being helped aboard the lifeboats, 
although there are still some ignoring this manner, who still try to force 
their way forward. 
 
Leadership 
The crew is trying to direct the evacuation and keep the passengers calm, 
but due to the competitive behavior shown by some people they are 
having difficulties in retaining the order. 
 
Insecurity 
Apart from the fact that the listing makes it difficult to launch the 
lifeboats, some of the crewmembers are seemingly insecure of how to 
release and/or maneuver the lifeboats. 
 
Screaming, 
shouting 
During the launching of the lifeboats, there is much yelling and shouting 
from both crew and passengers. Some of the passengers are screaming, 
seemingly afraid, as boats get stuck on the way down the side of the 
ship. Crewmembers are shouting at each other in attempts to 
communicate with the people in control of launching the boats. With all 
the loud noise, there are difficulties in the communication. 
 
Fear 
There are unmistakable signs of fear aboard the lifeboats as they are 
being launched. One crewmember falls outside one of the boats before 
his colleagues are helping to pull him back up. People are screaming and 
crying. 
 
Patience 
The people that do not fit on the first couple of lifeboats begin to make 
their ways to other areas of the ship to see if they have better luck 
elsewhere. Some passengers show signs of frustration while others are 
patiently waiting for their turn. 
 
Relief 
As the lifeboats finally reach the water, people are able to relax a bit 
more and there are spontaneous applauds and cheers of relief. However 
they are soon thereafter asked to quiet down in respect to the passengers 
still aboard the cruise ship. 
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Latter sequence of evacuation and search/rescue operation (approx. 00:00 à) 
- The period between the severe listing that made launching of lifeboats impossible on the 
portside of the ship, until the rescue operations were suspended. 
 
Unfortunately it has been proven extremely difficult to find any video footage 
covering the latter sequence of the evacuation – or more specifically, any material 
suitable for the purpose of this analysis. The recordings available of the latter 
sequence are mainly filmed from a distance by the coast guard’s helicopters and 
others outside the ship. The distant perspectives and low resolution of the footage 
makes it difficult to observe any specific behaviors. 
 
As time elapses, the listing of the ship comes to such a degree that launching of the 
lifeboats is no longer possible. Video footage from the rescue helicopters show that 
there are some people in the water, swimming for the beach, while many are still 
stuck onboard, some climbing down rope ladders to assisting rescue boats, others 
clinging on to the highest points they can reach. 
 
The divers that searched the ship in the days after the grounding filmed some of the 
scenes featured at the end of the documentary. Their footage shows stacks of 
furniture and other obstacles scattered all over, which also may have complicated 
the evacuation.  
 
There are several plausible explanations for the lack of close-up videos of the latter 
evacuation sequence. It may for example be that the increased listing of the ship 
made any filming too difficult. Or it may also be that the individuals that were 
actually filming anything were already evacuated, as the majority of people were by 
00:00 hrs. Again, these possible explanations are only assumptions. 
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5.3 Accounts from survivors 
There are copious amounts of information from survivors regarding the evacuation 
of the Costa Concordia, however their accounts are often fragmentary. The 
freshness of the passenger statements also vary, some were released shortly after the 
accident and others were not published until months or even years later, which may 
have had an impact on the stories told. It is also to be noted that a person’s 
definition of fear and panic may vary largely between individuals. A significant 
amount of accounts from passengers and crew have been studied and analyzed for 
this thesis but only a handful of representative comments are presented below, as 
the amount of material would otherwise be tremendous.  
 
Several passengers witness of scenes of panic and fear, but claim that they stayed 
relatively calm themselves. Others mention that the atmosphere onboard was 
generally calm during most part of the evacuation, until the listing of the ship 
increased severely and caused problems in the launching of lifeboats. One major 
issue that many of the passengers enlighten is the lack of communication, including 
language barriers as well as conflicting orders from the crew.  
 
In order to better understand the characteristics of the different phases of the 
evacuation, comments have been categorized into behaviors observed and divided 
into groups corresponding to the sequences described. 
 
Initial sequence (approx. 21:45 – 22:33) 
- The time between the first impact until the general emergency alarm is raised. 
Behaviors Comments from passengers and crew 
Panic 
Passenger: “There was just complete and utter chaos and panic. No one 
from the crew seemed to know what they were doing. It was just like 
something from the Titanic. Some of the crew were telling us to go back 
to our cabins while others were saying go to the life boats - it was 
obvious we were in serious trouble because we heard a terrible scraping 
noise.” (Daily Mail, 2012) 
 
Passenger: “We were having dinner aboard when we heard a loud noise, 
like that of the keel being dragged over something. The lights went out 
and there were scenes of panic, glasses falling to the floor.” (Daily Mail, 
2012) 
 
Fabio Costa, ship’s shop assistant: “Everything just started to fall, all the 
glasses broke and everybody started to panic and run.” (The Telegraph, 
2012a) 
 
Michelle, passenger: ”After the ship Hit it listed people rang and 
panicked we were told to go to our rooms”. (Michelle, 2012) 
 
Passengers: "Everything happened really fast. All of a sudden we felt the 
boat hitting something and everything just started to fall, all the glasses 
broke and everybody started to panic and run. I was under impression 
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that all of us were going to finish into the water. Panic spread through 
the ship. We were trying to find our daughter, but we did not find her, 
neither in the playroom nor in the theatre. Our search continued for the 
next hour and a half.” (Lasić, Žuljan Cvitanović, Uglešić, & Dodig, 
2012) 
 
Screaming, 
shouting 
Fernando Tofanelli, passenger: “Plates and tables were flying all over the 
place and people were falling over as the tilting got worse. People were 
shouting and screaming and it was absolute chaos.” (The Telegraph, 
2012a) 
 
Competitive 
behavior 
(trampling, 
scrambling) 
Passenger: ”We’re sitting at our dinner table when there was a loud bang 
and things just flew off the table. The lights went off and then came back 
on again and then everyone just started scrambling over each other to try 
and get a life vest or to the life boats. People were trampling over each 
other and children in the chaos.” (Daily Mail, 2012) 
 
Leadership 
James Thomas, ship’s dancer: "We had an announcement saying please 
stay calm, everything is under control, it's just a minor technical fault. 
Then we had the coding of two short blasts followed by alternate tones 
which means there is a leak on board and so the crew were divided, very 
much so. A lot of people said, 'no just tell everyone to stay calm, that's 
what we've been told to say'. But then other people took the initiative 
and said, 'Okay, let's tell everyone to stay calm but hand over life 
jackets'." (Mirror, 2012) 
 
Fernando Tofanelli, passenger: “While we were still in the dining room, 
the crew basically disappeared, and it was left to a few Thai waiters who 
didn’t speak English to try to keep us calm.” (The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Alberto Fiorito, ship’s engineer: “We didn’t wait for the captain to give 
the order to abandon ship. We saw how serious the situation was, and 
we did it ourselves.” (The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Michelle, passenger: “The announcements were that we had electrical 
problems everything was under control, the English was announced by 
our international host. We were told this twice and then by the staff 
numerous times, I think they believed it as well.” (Michelle, 2012) 
 
Humor 
Michelle, passenger: ”Cabin staff told us not to get our life jackets it was 
not necessary we sat on stools and the floor joking with them, this went 
on for what seemed like an hour, the boat struck just after 9pm I think.” 
(Michelle, 2012) 
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Main evacuation sequence (approx. 22:33 – 00:00) 
- The time after the general emergency alarm until the lifeboats on the portside of the ship 
can no longer be launched due to the listing. 
Behaviors Comments from passengers, crew, and rescuers 
Panic 
James Thomas, ship’s dancer: "It was initial panic but then the majority 
of us went, 'Okay, we've got to do this, we've got to pay attention to 
what we're doing"'. (Mirror, 2012) 
 
Mario Pellegrini, deputy mayor of Isola del Giglio: “There was one 
mother who was holding a baby. I said, 'Give me the child and I will put 
him on board the dinghy and then I will give you him back'. But the 
mother didn't want to, she was panicking and wouldn't let go of the 
baby. It was very difficult to get the baby from her.” (BBC, 2012) 
 
Fernando Tofanelli, passenger: “The crew left it until the very last 
moment to begin boarding people onto lifeboats. As a result, precious 
time was lost, and in the panic people began jumping into the water.”  
(The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Monique Maurek, passenger: ” There was a panic and my husband 
pushed me into a lifeboat to make sure I got on. Other people fell on top 
of me and I was screaming. People were falling out of the lifeboat in 
front of us down into the water.” (The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Phoebe Jones, ship’s dancer: “The ship went on a huge, huge lean. Some 
people started to panic, but I was fine. Even though I was so scared I still 
didn’t really get what was going on.” (The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Confusion 
Mario Pellegrini, deputy mayor of Isola del Giglio: ”At the beginning 
there wasn't much panic, just a lot of confusion. People didn't know 
what to do but there was no real fear. There were a lot of people who 
wanted to help but there was no-one guiding them; there was nobody 
was directing anything. There was goodwill by many people but many 
didn't even speak English, so it was difficult.” (BBC, 2012) 
 
Nancy Cacopardo, passenger: “The crew were all Asian and it was very 
hard to communicate with them. They were trying to help us and 
working hard to get us off, but there was so much confusion.”  
(The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Competitive 
behavior 
(pushing, 
forcing) 
Fernando Tofanelli, passenger: “After about an hour the ship finally 
sounded several blasts on the horn, and that was the signal to go to the 
lifeboats, but by then people were pushing each other to get out of the 
way, and some were leaping over the side into the sea. They didn’t have 
enough lifeboats for all the passengers because some appeared to be 
underwater from the ship leaning over.” (The Telegraph, 2012a) 
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Fabio Costa, ship’s shop assistant: “People panicking and pushing each 
other didn’t help at all. So we were all trying to keep people calm but it 
was just impossible, no one knew what was going on.” (The Telegraph, 
2012a) 
 
Edwin Gurd, passenger: “I was getting a bit disturbed about how a few 
male passengers were trying to force their way on to the lifeboats.”  
(The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Michelle, passenger: ”We got into the boats we had a waiter in the 
drivers seat and some boys in white overalls, the lifeboat filled to 
capacity and they shut the door, people screamed the door was pushed 
open and people continued to enter the boat overflowing it…”  
(Michelle, 2012) 
 
Passengers: ”Everybody tried to get a lifeboat and people started to 
panic. A lot of people were falling down the stairs and some were hurt 
because things were falling on them. Everybody was trying to get on the 
boats at the same time and they were pushing each other.” 
(Lasić, Žuljan Cvitanović, Uglešić, & Dodig, 2012) 
 
Disbelief in 
leadership 
Fernando Tofanelli, passenger: ”Some of the crew didn’t seem to even 
know how to release the lifeboats or even start the lifeboat engines once 
they were down on the water. The crewman in charge of our lifeboat 
was absolutely ashen-faced, he just didn’t know what to do.”  
(The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
 
 
Latter sequence of evacuation and search/rescue operation (approx. 00:00 à) 
- The period between the severe listing that made launching of lifeboats impossible on the 
portside of the ship, until the rescue operations were suspended. 
Behaviors  Comments from passengers, crew, and rescuers 
Panic 
Mario Pellegrini, deputy mayor of Isola del Giglio: ”Then I went on the 
right-hand side of the ship and it started tilting towards the sea. Big parts 
of the ship were going underwater - then panic erupted, people really 
were scared.”  
(BBC, 2012) 
 
Rose Metcalf, ship’s dancer: “We knew there would be too many people 
for the life rafts. We were literally throwing each other. We were 
creating human chains to try to pass people over gaps that if they 
dropped down there was no recovery from. There was panic, people 
were white – crying and screaming. I decided to wait until the water was 
high enough so I could jump or swim, but I didn’t want to be inside.  
(The Telegraph, 2012a) 
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Passengers: “It was a real horror! Every second we feared of the worst 
happening! We are still not aware of what we experienced during the 
accident. We do not believe that this could happen. We are constantly 
ruminating pictures of people struggling for life, blood, panic, fear, 
crying... All of us still have nightmares." (Lasić, Žuljan Cvitanović, 
Uglešić, & Dodig, 2012) 
 
Fear, crying 
Mario Pellegrini, deputy mayor of Isola del Giglio: “When the boat 
started listing, all the corridors filled with water. They were like wells 
and there was a lot of people stuck in these wells. Using a rope, I started 
to pull people up. They were crying and were really scared.” (BBC, 
2012) 
 
Screaming, 
shouting 
Mario Pellegrini, deputy mayor of Isola del Giglio: ”While I was pulling 
people out of the upended corridor, one girl started shouting and pulling 
and we had to take her out by her feet.” (BBC, 2012) 
 
Freezing 
Mario Pellegrini, deputy mayor of Isola del Giglio: “A lot of the old 
people attached themselves to anything they could find and they didn't 
want to let go so we had to go down and detach them finger by finger.” 
(BBC, 2012) 
 
Competitive 
behavior 
(fighting, 
crushing, 
scrambling, 
pushing) 
Mario Pellegrini, deputy mayor of Isola del Giglio: “People were 
fighting with each other in order to get on the rope to climb up. I can't 
condemn them because the situation was really bad. It was really 
dramatic.” (BBC, 2012) 
 
Ian Donoff, passenger: “There was this mad scramble for a ladder: 
people got crushed pushed and goodness knows what – it was like a free 
for all… Children seemed to be treated with some sort of reverence, so 
they were pushed up quicker, but apart from that it was hell.”  
(The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Calm 
Ian Donoff, passenger: “Some people were freaking out, others were 
staying incredibly calm.” (The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Leadership 
Mario Pellegrini, deputy mayor of Isola del Giglio: “Then, on the 
bridge, I came across the only officer I could find. He was young, a 
second-class officer… We were together shoulder to shoulder until 05:30 
in the morning. I have to say this young officer was wonderful. He 
hadn't been given any orders; he was just following his own orders.” 
(BBC, 2012) 
 
Ian Donoff, passenger: “The lifeboat crews took over and they were 
fantastic. They lifted people onto their boats before transferring them to 
other lifeboats to the mainland and evacuating them away from the 
ship.” (The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Rose Metcalf, ship’s dancer: “I was making sure the people on my life 
raft had their jackets done up. I was trying to keep people talking, was 
   
31 
trying to keep the mood calm and keep practical. My heart was racing, 
but I was calm to everyone else.” (The Telegraph, 2012a) 
 
Heroism 
James Thomas, ship’s dancer: "I was willing to give my life to make sure 
they (passengers) reached safety. I know a Bulgarian engineer, he swam 
with an Indian man on his back because he had no life jacket and had 
injured himself. Some of the stories are phenomenal... you just see 
people's true nature and how caring everyone was for people on board… 
It's crazy because it's not in my character to even think that I could do 
any of those things that I did, but I managed to pull myself together and 
help people and be helped myself by another passenger and I couldn't 
thank him any more.” (Mirror, 2012) 
 
Mario Pellegrini, deputy mayor of Isola del Giglio: ”It was a purser of 
the ship who was helping me and we rescued about nine people. Some 
of them were quite old; some of them were children…The doctor also 
helped me; he was very good and courageous.” (BBC, 2012) 
 
Nicole Servels, passenger: “For an hour we had waited in line to get into 
a lifeboat – my husband let everyone else go first … I can’t swim so he 
gave me his lifejacket. He shouted, ’Jump, jump, jump!’. I froze and 
couldn’t jump, but he jumped off the ship and shouted upwards, ’Come 
on, don’t worry’. I jumped off and the last thing I heard him say was that 
I would be fine. I never saw him again.”  (The Telegraph, 2012a) 
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5.4 Scientific studies and investigations 
This section constitutes information gathered from studies and investigations that 
have been peer reviewed, and hence achieved a scientific status. 
5.4.1 Evacuation analysis by David E. Alexander 
Roughly one month after the disaster David E. Alexander wrote a paper on the 
Costa Concordia grounding by the title: The 'Titanic Syndrome': Risk and Crisis 
Management on the Costa Concordia. In his paper Alexander reconstructs the sequence 
of events before, during and immediately after the event, based mostly on 
secondary sources such as the media, video recordings, and marine data etc. The 
paper also considers how real-time management of the crisis affected the evacuation 
of passengers, staff and crew from the liner. Furthermore, he makes comparisons 
with some other well-known maritime disasters to show that the Costa Concordia 
incident had various key elements in common with these. The following timeline of 
events is derived from Alexander’s report: 
 
13.01.2012 
 
• At 19:33 the Costa Concordia sets sail from the port of Civitavecchia. 
• At 21:30 the 'salute' approach to Isola del Giglio is set in motion. 
• At 21:45 the ship strikes a rock, traveling at 15 knots. 
• Between 21:45 - 21:55 the ship decelerates to 0 knots and turns more than 
180 degrees. 
• At 21:56 the ship comes to rest on the shore of Isola del Giglio. 
• At 22:12 officers make contact with Port Authority of Livorno. 
• At 22:15 the passengers are advised to return to their cabins. 
• At 22:26 the Master requests the assistance of a tug. 
• At 22:42 the Master admits to Port Authority that the situation is critical. 
• At 22:45 ad hoc unofficial evacuation begins; the main evacuation lasts until 
about 01.45 
• At 22:58 the Master gives the general order to evacuate. 
 
14.01.2012 
 
• At 01:30 the Master abandons the ship 
• At 01:45 the harbor Master of Livorno 'orders' the Master of Costa 
Concordia to return to the ship (which he does not) 
• At 03:45 six hundred passengers are evacuated from Isola del Giglio to the 
mainland by ferry. 
• At 05:30 the last senior officer abandons the ship while a few tens of people 
are still left on board 
 
15.01.2012 
 
• At 07:30 the last living person (a crew member) is evacuated from the ship; 
the search for bodies continues for more than one month. 
 
By the time Alexander’s analysis was published, 15 people were confirmed to be 
dead and another 17 bodies were still missing.   
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In his paper, Alexander carefully declares that his work is “pieced together on the 
basis of careful comparison between many documents originating in different 
countries and from diverse sources”, but that he cannot guarantee the accurateness 
of the information. To statue an example of his apprehensions being justified; in the 
paper Alexander suggests that the ship had a total of 3229 passenger on board at the 
time of the accident, this however deviates from what was later stated in the official 
investigation report; 3206 passengers (refer to section 5.4.3). Furthermore 
Alexander also wrote that the impact with the rock left an “about 70 meters long 
and up to 48.8 meters wide” gash on the port side of the hull. The latter information 
is clearly exaggerated as the official investigation report confirmed the gash to be 53 
meters long. This once again proves that information retrieved from the media can 
be delusive. 
 
The pieced-together narrative is followed by Alexander’s interpretations and 
analysis of the event. His understanding is that the first official reaction on the 
bridge after the collision was to minimize the communications with the public. The 
impact was accompanied by a loud boom and groan noise, after which the ship 
jolted and rapidly decelerated, throwing objects around on board. The passengers 
were told over the public address system that the ship had a technical fault, but that 
the situation was under control. The passengers were also advised to either go back 
to their cabins, or go for a walk. A hiatus of direct leadership thereafter led to that a 
significant amount of time was lost between the initial collision and the start of the 
evacuation. Alexander notes that when the disembarking procedure of the ship was 
finally set in motion, the heavy listing of the ship made the evacuation hazardous 
and caused great difficulties in the launching of lifeboats and rafts. He also makes 
comment (based on video footage and interviews) on the sporadic scenes of ‘panic’ 
that erupted amongst some of the passengers: 
 
“…there are clear indications of panic, competitive behavior and chaotic 
reactions on the part of evacuees. Nonetheless, the panic was swiftly mitigated by 
spontaneous leadership and the level-headed behavior of some passengers. This 
confirms the findings of more than half a century of sociological literature on 
panic; namely, that it is an uncommon, transient and short-lived phenomenon 
that is usually a reaction to specific circumstances, principally fear of immediate 
entrapment. Hence, as the literature and available evidence would indicate, on 
the Costa Concordia panic was not particularly widespread and, as is commonly 
the case, it was not a major factor in changing the social processes of evacuation.” 
 
The evacuation of the Costa Concordia was largely led and directed by 
entertainment and hospitality staff, Alexander says. He also states that many of 
them appeared to lack adequate training in the necessary evacuation procedures. 
Furthermore he makes notice of the problems caused by language barriers as 
several of the staff members that tried to lead the evacuation had scarce knowledge 
of English, or none of Italian (which was crucial as a majority of the passengers 
were of Italian origin). Alexander proposes that the combination of the increasing 
listing and the lack of adequate command and diligence caused a climate of 
frustration and competitive behavior among the passengers on board. 
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To finish off the evacuation analysis, Alexander says there is a general assumption 
that “information which is either alarming or uncertain will lead to maladaptive 
behavior, usually of a chaotic, competitive nature … on the other hand, giving 
passengers misleading information could easily lead to preventable deaths and 
injuries.” 
 
To summarize Alexander’s conclusions of the Costa Concordia evacuation 
sequence, there are obvious signs of breakdown in the chain of command, which 
lead to avoidable chaos and competitive behavior among the passengers. The 
consistently poor communication with passengers and the fact that the evacuation 
process was supervised by poorly trained staff invoked risky procedures that could 
easily have ended with more casualties.  
 
(Alexander, 2012) 
5.4.2 Passenger evacuation review by RINA 
The Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA) has published a review of the 
passenger evacuation of Costa Concordia on their website. 
 
RINA first of all made notice, that out of the 3206 passengers aboard, 696 persons 
had not yet taken part of the muster drill at the time of the accident. They also point 
out the bridge’s severe lack of understanding and sharing of information regarding 
the extent of the damage. E.g., within 10 minutes of the initial impact, the Chief 
engineer had informed the personnel on the bridge about flooding in two of the 
watertight compartments, and within 25 minutes it was confirmed that at least four 
WTC’s were breached (Marine Casualties Investigative Body, 2013). When the 
Master after 35 minutes asked the bridge staff about how many compartments that 
were affected, the response was “three compartments flooded”. In reality, a total of 
six compartments were already breached. 
 
Furthermore, RINA express their strong disapproval of the delay of the 
disembarking procedure. Their opinion is that even if assuming that only two of the 
WTC’s were flooded, the appropriate response would be to immediately sound the 
general emergency alarm to get the passengers to their muster stations, in 
preparation for a safe and orderly evacuation. Instead, the first announcement to 
the passengers was that the ship suffered a blackout due to an electrical fault. 
At some point it would have been fairly obvious that the ship suffered from more 
than just an electrical fault – as of why many of the passengers and crew put on 
their lifejackets and assembled in the lifeboat areas, long before the general 
emergency alarm was raised.  
 
RINA continue their evacuation review by highlighting some additional issues that 
may have had a significant impact on the protraction of the evacuation:  
 
“Apparent lack of co-ordination and direction from bridge team to crew involved in safety 
issues hindered the management of the general emergency and abandon ship phases and 
contributed to initiatives being taken by individuals. Some of this poor communication seems 
to have been put down to the lack of wireless telephone system between the key personnel 
involved in the emergency.” 
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They also comment on the possible lack of understanding and/or training of some 
of the crew about their individual roles and responsibilities in an emergency:  
 
“Some of the officers in charge of the lifeboats either did not possess the correct safety 
certification or their certificates had expired. The majority of the crew were Filipinos, Indian, 
and Indonesian. In total the crew was made up of 38 different nationalities. Not all the crew 
were able to understand the emergency instructions in the ships working language (Italian).” 
 
RINA notes that many passengers were ready to board the lifeboats early on in the 
evacuation process, but were prevented from doing so by the crew who were 
awaiting the captains abandon ship order. They suggest this may have contributed 
to the unrest reported by the passengers in the assembly areas. They also speculate 
that some officers may have started organizing an evacuation even before the 
captain gave his order.  
 
(RINA, 2016) 
5.4.3 Official investigation report 
On May 23, 2013 the Marine Casualties Investigative Body released a thorough 
investigation of the Costa Concordia disaster on assignment from the Italian 
Ministry of Infrastructures and Transports. A large portion of the investigation 
focuses on the navigational aspects leading to the accident, this is outside the scope 
of the thesis and will not be further discussed in this report. However, some of the 
more significant events that took place thereafter are presented below in 
chronological order. A short summary of the events is also illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
13.01.2012  
 
• At 21:45:07 (according to the AIS) the Costa Concordia cruise ship crashes 
with it’s portside of the hull into a large underwater rock, east of the islands 
“Le Scole”. Soon thereafter the power onboard goes off. The emergency 
batteries are turned on, but they are only supplying the emergency lighting 
and internal communications. Six minutes after the impact it is discovered 
that the hull has a breach. The ship begins to list towards the portside. 
• At 21:54:47 a blackout is announced on board and the passengers are 
reassured that the situation is under control. 
• At 22:06 the MRSC Livorno is contacted by the Carabinieri of Prato who 
reports that they have received a phone call from the mother of one of the 
Costa Concordia passengers. Apparently the passengers had been ordered to 
put lifejackets on after a portion of a ceiling had collapsed. 
• At 22:11 the ship is practically motionless and begins to drift, and shift the 
bow to starboard. 
• Between 22:10 and 22:15 the list goes from the portside to the starboard side.  
• At 22:22:22 the ship contacts the operations room of Civitavecchia Coast 
Guard, asking for the assistance of two tugs due to a breach. It is also 
reported that the situation is under control and that there are no injured or 
missing people. 
• At 22:25 MRSC Livorno contacts the Master of Costa Concordia. He 
reports that the ship has a hull breach on the portside of the ship. He also 
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communicates that the flooding is causing a gradual heel and that there are 
dead or injured people on board. Again he asks for the assistance of tugs.  
• At 22:29:24 the Chief Engineer reports to the bridge that the board power, 
the communications, and the Martec system are out of service.  
Meanwhile, the water continues to rise and flood through the fire doors at 
deck 0. The water has also reached the aft elevators, kitchen and buffet 
preparation areas. 
• At 22:30:08 some passengers start to enter the lifeboats although the bridge 
has not yet announced neither the abandon ship order, nor the general 
emergency alarm. 
• At 22:33:26 the general emergency alarm is raised. The passengers are 
informed that situation is under control. 
• At 22:36:05 the Master makes the first announcement to the passengers to 
go to the muster stations.  
• At 22:36:34 MRSC Livorno contacts the ship again. The bridge reports that 
the heeling is increasing. The Master also notifies to have 3208 passengers 
on board (in reality 3206) and 1023 crewmembers (in each case a different 
number from what was stated at the Port of Civitavecchia on departure: 
3216 passengers and 1030 members of crew).  
• At 22:39 a patrol boat informs MRSC Livorno to have come alongside the 
cruiser, and that the ship looks visibly down by the stern.  
• At 22:49:57 the Second Master orders to prepare the first lifeboats at 
starboard side.  
• At 22:50:08 the Master order lifeboats 1,3,5,7 at sea. 
• At 22:51:15 the Master informs the bridge to raise the abandon ship order.  
• At 22:54 the Second Master communicates the abandon ship order in 
English through the public address system.  
• At 22:55 UCG Civitavecchia receives a call from the local State Police who 
reports that the ship is launching the lifeboats with passengers on board (in 
fact, the abandon ship operation must have already been in place for some 
time as the patrol boat simultaneously warns rescue boats to pay attention as 
there are already three lifeboats in the water). 
• At 22:58 the cruiser is practically still in it’s final position.  
• At 23:10 the patrol boat reports to MRSC Livorno that the lifeboats are 
heading for the south harbor of Giglio island, the life rafts however, are 
being towed and placed alongside the ferry "Aegilium". 
• At 23:11 the list of the ship is more than 25-30°.  
• At 23:16:36 the Master orders everyone one the bridge to bring the radios 
and go to the bridge lifeboats.  
• At 23:19:34 the bridge is abandoned except for the Second Master that stays 
to coordinate the evacuation.  
• At 23:32:56 the Second Master also leaves the bridge. 
• At 23:35 MRCC Rome contacts the FCC who announces that the 
abandonment is almost complete. 
• At 23:38 MRSC Livorno contacts the Master by phone, he reports that there 
is still an estimated 200/300 people left on board including passengers and 
crew. This number is confirmed (300/400), by the patrol boat. 
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14.01.2012  
 
• At 00:00 the scenario changes. The cruiser rapidly lists towards the starboard 
side, to such a degree that there are significant difficulties in embarking life-
saving appliances on the portside, thus creating three large groups of people 
(at the bow, center and stern of the ship). Some people are seen jumping into 
the water. In view of the simultaneous presence of shipwrecked at sea and 
the need to search and recover even within the now submerged part of the 
ship, MRSC Livorno dispose the activation of the diver teams.  
• At 00:18 the OSC reports that there are about a hundred people on the 
portside of the ship. Three minutes later the OSC also mention that several 
passengers, in panic, has begun to jump into the water.  
• At 00:34 MRSC Livorno contacts the Master of the Costa Concordia on his 
cellphone. He refers about the landing of all persons on board. To the 
requests of clarifications relating to what is happening on the portside, the 
Master declares that he is on board a lifeboat on the opposite side; he also 
reports that it is engaged in the recovery of some survivors. When asked 
about who has remained on board to coordinate abandon ship operations, 
he replies that the entire crew has evacuated.  
• At 00:36 a patrol boat reports to MRSC Livorno that there are at least 70/80 
people left on board the ship, including elderly and children, this 
information is also confirmed by a helicopter. 
• At 00:41 the FCC calls MRCC Rome to ask for assistance as the ship is 
completely listed (90 °) to the starboard side, and that there are about 50 
people left that are no longer able to leave the ship.  
• At 00:42 MRSC Leghorn contacts the Master of Costa Concordia who says 
that there seems to be a hundred passengers left on the ship. 
• At 00:53 helicopters are set in to rescue the people still on board the ship.  
• At 01:35 the OSC updates MRSC Livorno about the situation and passes on 
the information from a passenger who claims that there are still about 400 
people on board assisted by crewmembers disembarking on the portside. 
• At 02:00 a patrol boat takes on board the first team of firefighters with 
thermal cutting equipment (to release any people trapped inside the ship). 
• At 03:44 there is still an estimated 40/50 people left on board.  
• At 04:20 the OSC updates the situation, they are still disembarking people 
through the aft side ladder. 
• At 04:30 MRSC Livorno orders the Safety Officer, with a team of 
firefighters, to assist the rescuers aboard in the search for the missing people. 
• At 05:15 another team of firefighters board the ship to see if there are still 
people trapped on board, shortly thereafter they recover two traumatized. 
• At 06:17 the first rescuers suspend their search operations on the ship.  
 
In the following days the search and rescue operations continued with the use of the 
Coast Guard’s divers team, Police, Navy and Fire Department. Three more people 
that were trapped within the ship were recovered and rescued by divers on 14th of 
January, more than 24 hours after the accident. The search of survivors at sea 
continued with the patrol boats of the Coast Guard and of the other government 
departments that contributed in the rescue operations as well as by helicopters.  
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Figure 7 A summary of the time-line obtained from the official investigation report illustrates some of the most significant 
events of the disaster 
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The complete passenger data, which was later supplied by Costa Cruises, indicate 
that there were a total of 4229 people on board the ship at the time of the accident, 
including 3206 passengers and 1023 crew. Out of the passengers, there were 2954 
adults, 200 children (under 12 years old), and 52 babies (under 3 years old). 
 
A total of 4197 people were rescued. Among these, about 1270 were rescued by the 
rescue units intervened directly under the coordination of MRSC of Livorno.  
-  80 people on board the Costa Concordia life rafts were tugged  
-  16 people were rescued by helicopter 
-  4 people were rescued from the sea  
It is estimated that the remaining survivors abandoned the ship on survival crafts 
(boats and life rafts) and reached the coast autonomously. 
 
(Marine Casualties Investigative Body, 2013) 
 
A total of 32 people did not survive the Costa Concordia disaster. Most of the 
victims were found trapped inside the ship, some drowned as they tried to swim 
ashore. Several bodies were found by divers within the vicinity of a two-story 
restaurant on decks 3 and 4 (The Telegraph, 2012a). 
 
Table 1 The following chart summarizes the deceased and missing passengers (Marine Casualties 
Investigative Body, 2013). 
Number Age Gender Passenger/Crew	 Status	
1 6 F Passenger	 Deceased	
2 37 M Passenger	 Deceased	
3 79 F Passenger	 Deceased	
4 25 M Passenger	 Deceased	
5 49 M Crew	 Deceased	
6 30 F Passenger	 Deceased	
7 30 M Crew	 Deceased	
8 67 M Passenger	 Deceased	
9 72 M Passenger	 Deceased	
10 30 M Crew	 Deceased	
11 70 F Passenger	 Deceased	
12 69 M Passenger	 Deceased	
13 52 F Passenger	 Deceased	
14 60 M Passenger	 Deceased	
15 70 F Passenger	 Deceased	
16 70 M Passenger	 Deceased	
17 39 M Passenger	 Deceased	
18 23 F Passenger	 Deceased	
19 86 M Passenger	 Deceased	
20 72 F Passenger	 Deceased	
21 62 M Passenger	 Deceased	
22 70 F Passenger	 Deceased	
23 32 M Crew	 Missing	1	
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24 72 F Passenger	 Deceased	
25 71 F Passenger	 Deceased	
26 71 M Passenger	 Deceased	
27 35 F Crew	 Missing	1	
28 67 F Passenger	 Deceased	
29 50 F Passenger	 Deceased	
30 49 F Passenger	 Deceased	
31 60 F Passenger	 Deceased	
32 73 M Passenger	 Deceased	
 
Commentary note:  
 
1. On 23rd of May 2013 when the investigative report was released, there were 
still two bodies known to be missing. On 26th of September 2013 the remains 
of another body was found, which through DNA analysis was later 
confirmed to be of a missing Italian female passenger (La Nazione, 2013). In 
August 2014 while the Costa Concordia ship was moored in the port of 
Genoa, divers found a human skull and bone fragments on the wreck, which 
potentially could be of the missing Indian male crewmember (RTÉ, 2014). It 
is also to be noted that in the official investigation report it is stated that the 
missing female was a crewmember of age 35, but the body that was 
recovered in 2013 was identified as a female passenger of age 50. There was 
however a female Peruvian 25 years old crewmember identified amongst the 
first recovered bodies (The Telegraph, 2012b). 
 
Figure 8 below illustrates the estimated heeling of the Costa Concordia cruiser from 
the time of the impact with the rocks. 
 
Figure 8 Note that the time specifications of the x-axis are in UTC – to read the actual local time; 1 hour 
should be added (image retrieved from Wikimedia Commons, the work is based on the MIT Official 
Investigation Report by: Soerfm) 
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6 Discussion 
Firstly, it is advisable to note that the case study of this paper has been somewhat 
delimited in terms of language skills of the author, as the only material analyzed 
within the thesis has been what was available in English. It is reasonable to expect 
that the transcripts of witness statements from the Italian court proceedings 
succeeding the incident would add substantial value to the analysis of human 
behavior in the Costa Concordia disaster. Furthermore, although a vast amount of 
material has been analyzed, there is always the possibility that obtainable sources of 
high significance have remained unseen due to the ‘jungle’ of information available. 
 
Regarding the accounts of survivors, it is possible that journalists have altered some 
of the contents, as the media has a tendency of exaggerating certain stories in order 
to make an article more “newsworthy” or appealing to the readers. This may have 
had a certain impact on some of the stories told, although the attempt has been to 
only cite the words of the evacuees. Moreover, another delimitation of the accounts 
of the evacuees is that they are often quite fragmentary and not entirely easy to 
place into the time-line of events, as the stories are sometimes a bit jumpy or not 
always specifically referring to a certain time. Therefore, some qualified guesswork 
has been undertaken when putting the survivors’ statements into the behavior 
tables. 
 
Essentially many of the uncertainties described above could probably have been 
eliminated, or at least reduced, had a systematical analysis of the witness statements 
from the court proceedings been undertaken. In example, there would be no doubts 
as of whether a certain statement is the words of a journalist, or the actual words of 
a survivor. Furthermore, there is also a good chance that such an analysis could 
have provided more quantitative figures as of how many passengers and crew that 
could relate certain behaviors – compared to this analysis.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the available video recordings may not depict an entirely 
righteous image of the events as a whole – especially the latter sequence of the 
evacuation would be interesting to analyze further. As previously suggested, it may 
also be that the available video recordings only show the situations where people 
felt comfortable enough to pick up their mobile phones or video-camcorders in 
order to record the ongoing activities. As the listing of the ship increased it is 
possible that any filming was deemed “impossible”.  
 
With this being said, the discussions will hereafter attempt to address the research 
questions of the thesis. 
 
In accordance with the hypothesis of Fahy et al. (amongst several others), the term 
‘panic’ has been largely over-used also in the case of the Costa Concordia disaster. 
Panic was referred to in almost every other article or news report by the media, and 
a great amount of the disaster victims used the term to explain the behaviors of 
others and sometimes to describe their own state of fear. Even in the scientific 
studies the term showed up surprisingly often. However, just as Alexander (2012) 
pointed out, although there were some indications of panic behavior and chaotic 
reactions on part of the evacuees, the panic was swiftly mitigated. Hence, it is not 
likely that panic behavior had a major impact on the evacuation process as a whole. 
In fact, the only examples of truly irrational behaviors discovered during the work 
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with this thesis are found in the accounts of Mario Pellegrini, the deputy mayor of 
Isola del Giglio, who went aboard the cruiser right before midnight. I.e. he 
describes how he was trying to aid a mother holding a baby to get aboard a lifeboat, 
but the mother had refused to let to of the child – he had to “struggle to get the baby 
from her”. He further refers to people that would scream and refuse to let go of 
railings and the interior they were clinging on to, and that they would literally have 
to be detached by force. Again, panic might not be the appropriate word to describe 
these behaviors either – supposedly ‘fear’ is a better explanatory term, even if the 
behaviors may be seen as somewhat irrational. Nonetheless, it is possible that some 
people aboard suffered from swift moments of true panic, and panic behavior might 
have been the cause for some of the people jumping into the water rather than 
awaiting rescue. On the other hand, jumping into the water could also be the result 
of decisions made through rational thinking.  
In summary the term panic seems to have been used mainly by people trying to 
explain the competitive behaviors of others and by those trying to describe the 
overall ‘chaotic’ atmosphere aboard. When relating to their own emotions or 
behaviors, people were more likely to use words such as fear or confusion. To give 
one typical example; “The ship went on a huge, huge lean. Some people started to 
panic, but I was fine. Even though I was so scared I still didn’t really get what was 
going on.” 
 
Based on the video footage, the accounts of survivors, as well as the official 
investigation and the scientific studies, a few management issues were identified 
that might have contributed in reducing the effectiveness of the evacuation 
procedures. 
 
What stands out in particular is the recurrent expression of utter confusion that 
many refer to. It is clear that the passengers as well as the majority of the crew were 
not sure of what was happening or how to behave. The distinct grind and boom 
noise accompanied by the jolting of the ship, shortly followed by the power outage 
and the incongruous statement from the bridge claiming the situation was under 
control, was obviously very contradictory. As no one seemed to be sure of how to 
behave, the reactions of people varied quite a bit; some appeared to freeze, some 
ran off to investigate, and some started screaming and shouting. The confusion was 
further enhanced by conflicting orders from the staff, as well as by communication 
problems due to language barriers etc.  
 
The reaction of the officers in command, operating the bridge – e.g. to minimize the 
communications with the public – may be a result of the common belief that panic 
might ‘break out’ among the passengers if it was announced that the ship had a hull 
breach. However, as pointed out by Fahy et al. (2009), what people really need in 
order to make timely decisions is information. Given adequate information, people 
can improve their awareness of the situation and thus prepare themselves for what 
is to come next, making them more competent in weighing their options before 
engaging in appropriate actions. Instead no information was given, which caused 
an initial state of frustration, anxiety, and suspicion etc. among the passengers. 
 
The other major result of keeping the information from the passengers and crew 
revealed itself when time came to evacuate. Almost an hour of time was lost that 
could have been used to assemble the passengers and prepare the launching of 
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lifeboats. When the general emergency alarm was finally raised – although a great 
portion of the passengers had already made their way to the muster stations – many 
were caught somewhat “off guard” and had to rush to collect their lifejackets before 
continuing to the muster stations. This may have caused additional unnecessary 
stress and disorder. The delay of the evacuation also allowed the listing to increase 
further, which in turn made the timeframe to launch the lifeboats a lot narrower. 
Seemingly affected by the stressful atmosphere, some people began to show signs of 
competitive behavior, pushing and elbowing their way forward, thus further 
decreasing the chances of a smooth and orderly disembarkation. As suggested by 
Drury et al., (2009a, 2009b), competitive behavior is a sign that people sense a low 
degree of group identification, which – to a certain degree – could be a result of 
differences in pre-existing norms, values etc. Another explanation for the perceived 
pushing could also be due to the physical constraints, as more and more people 
gathered by the lifeboats – even more so as some of the lifeboats were not able to 
launch. 
 
In the latter sequences of the evacuation, the increased listing of the ship also 
caused difficulties in walking upright, as well as causing furniture and other interior 
to fall over –further decreasing the accessibility. All in all, it is fair to suggest that 
the evacuation could have been much more effective, had the passengers and 
affected staff been provided with sufficient information at an earlier stage. 
 
Yet another issue that is widely referred to, is the “seeming lack of adequate 
training” in many of the staff and crewmembers. This may very well be the case, 
but it is also feasible that their abilities were further affected by the negative stress. 
As Robinson (2012) stated, it is possible for victims of disasters (including crew) to 
temporarily forget how to use emergency equipment, or how to maneuver the 
lifeboats i.e. Even though the staff is trained in handling evacuation procedures, 
very few have actually experienced a real emergency. Thus, when a disaster finally 
occurs, even a well-trained person may not always perform in accordance with his 
or her expectations. However, a well-rehearsed routine will obviously have a 
greater chance of success compared to one seldom performed, e.g. the chances of 
staff conducting appropriate behaviors increases with routine by training. It is 
therefore of uttermost importance to ensure that all staff and crewmembers – with 
duties assigned in case of an emergency – are sufficiently trained.  
 
As many as 696 passengers had not yet been briefed on the emergency procedures 
at the time when the accident occurred. Obviously taking part of a muster drill is of 
great help to the passengers if it comes to an emergency. Having gone through the 
procedure, even just once, is likely to have positive impact on the evacuees’ chances 
to act in an appropriate manner. For ships on routes where the requirement of 
muster drills do not apply, the evacuation relies even more on the aid of staff, 
informative announcements, signage, lighting, etc. The importance of well 
functioning evacuation procedures and informative evacuation aid can therefore 
not be enough stressed. 
 
As previously mentioned, language barriers further enhanced the onboard 
confusion during the disaster. According to RINA (2016), the staff was made up of 
38 different nationalities, with a majority that was not able to understand the 
working language of the ship (Italian), and many that had scarce knowledge of 
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English (if any). Needless to say, this is bound to cause communication problems in 
stressed situations, not only between crew and passengers, but also between crew of 
different nationalities. Higher measures need to be taken to ensure that the crew, at 
least all involved in the evacuation procedures, are able to communicate with each 
other as well as with passengers.  
 
The behavior sequence model may be used to explain the chain of consecutive 
actions that unfolded among passengers and crew after the grounding, e.g., after 
receiving the first set of cues; namely the grind and boom noise and the jolting of 
the ship, the interpret-phase was set in motion. Indications of this magnitude are 
hard to miss and it is therefore legitimate to assume that most people did not ignore 
these ques. As for the prepare-phase, some of the people seemed relatively satisfied 
by the following message from the captain, and their consecutive actions were 
therefore to withdraw and wait for further instructions. Others were more 
suspicious and began to explore, searching for further ques. Some of the staff 
instructed passengers to calm down and stay put, while others were instructing to 
head for the emergency exits. As time passed, the increased listing of the ship 
provided further indications of something being wrong, eventually resulting in 
people entering the act-phase; warning others, evacuating, etc. 
 
A number of observations that were made in this analysis of the costa Concordia 
disaster can also be explained by using the affiliative model. For example, the 
tendency pointed out by Sime (1983), namely that people separated from their 
family members tend to respond very quickly to initial indications of threat, was 
proved to be the case also in the costa Concordia disaster – as discussed by Lazic et 
al, (2012).  Although being reassured that the situation was under control, the 
interviewed family said they immediately begun searching for their missing 
daughter. Furthermore, the affiliative model can be used to explain why people in 
the Costa Concordia disaster formed groups consisting of friends, colleagues, or 
relatives during the evacuation. The analyzed interviews and observed video-
recordings also reveal that people surrounded by their group showed a more 
“relaxed” response to the initial cues of the accident – i.e. they were somewhat 
more content with the reassurances received from the staff. This strengthens the 
part of the theory that says individuals of complete groups may be gaining a 
deceptive feeling of security for being part of their group.  
The affiliative model further suggests that people are more likely to move towards 
familiar places when they are in a threatening situation, e.g. that they are more 
inclined to exit the same way they entered a room, rather than using the designated 
emergency routes (Sime J. , 1985). It has not been possible to verify this part of the 
theory as the interviews and video-recordings analyzed in this report provides 
almost no information regarding which egress routes were being used more 
frequently, respectively less frequent. However, it is possible that if access was 
gained to the recordings from the ship’s internal security cameras (if there were any) 
it could provide sufficient material to draw any further conclusions.  
Lastly, as previously mentioned passenger ships are indeed unfamiliar 
environments to the majority of the people aboard – the affiliation model might 
therefore be used as part of the explanation to the peoples’ general hesitancy to 
evacuate.  
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In the Costa Concordia disaster, both positive and negative aspects of normative 
and informational social influence were observed. When some of the passengers 
started moving towards the mustering stations at an early stage, this was a clear 
signal for some of the others to follow. In this particular context this occurrence 
may be regarded as a positive aspect of informational social influence, considering 
it later proved to be a real emergency.  
A negative form of normative social behavior could instead be to conform to the 
behavior of those that listened to the instructions of the staff and returned to their 
cabins – despite the alarming indications of disaster.  
It is hard, if not to say impossible, to distinguish between the two types of social 
behavior when looking at the video recordings. Nevertheless, whether it depends on 
informative or normative social influence, it is clear that people were affected by the 
presence and actions of others. Even though many passengers returned to their 
cabins, video-recordings show that they kept their cabin doors open so that they 
would be able to keep an eye at what the other passengers were doing. This further 
strengthens the theory laid out by Deutsch & Gerard, 1955, whish suggests that 
people look to other people for information in ambiguous situations and when 
unsure of how to behave. 
Other aspects of the social behavior theory were not possible to confirm, nor deny. 
The findings of Latané & Darley (1968) and Nilsson and Johansson (2009) suggest 
that individuals that are alone respond much quicker to indications of a threat 
compared to individuals that are part of a group. To verify this pattern in the Costa 
Concordia disaster, one would have to be able to observe the behaviors of people in 
separate spaces, simultaneously. The public video recordings have been insufficient 
in this matter, however as previously suggested; if access was gained to the 
recordings from the ship’s internal security cameras – further conclusions may be 
drawn. 
 
Furthermore, the role-rule model has been proven suitable to explain the roles and 
associated guidelines that people adopted during the evacuation. For example, the 
staff with designated duties of aiding the evacuation was more likely to investigate 
and explore the early signs of the disaster. Passengers witnessed about staff 
“running their way” right after the ship struck the rock. It is likely that these staff 
members were headed to search for further clues, or instructions from their 
superiors. On the other hand, the staff without such duties seemed somewhat more 
inclined to continue their everyday tasks – video recordings show how kitchen staff 
and cleaning personnel go back to their regular duties. Recordings and witness 
statements also suggest that most of the passengers were withdrawing and waiting 
for further instructions, which also fit well into the theories of the role-rule model. 
Also, parents ensured the safety of their children and people with natural leadership 
qualities stepped forward and aided the evacuation – additional examples of actions 
that strengthen the findings of Canter et al. (1980), Tong & Canter (1985) and 
Pigott (1989). 
 
The four behavioral models mentioned above are not only valuable when trying to 
interpret the behaviors of people in a past disaster, they may also be useful at a 
design stage when trying to predict the behaviors of people.  
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Some of the identified behaviors that may have contributed in reducing the 
effectiveness of the evacuation procedures include: 
 
• Confusion – is an indication that people are struggling to find an appropriate 
behavior. May delay the time it takes for people to act. 
• ‘Freezing’ – leaving people seemingly paralyzed, also an indication of people 
having difficulties in adopting an appropriate behavior, as explained by 
Robinson (2012). May complicate the evacuation of the ‘frozen’ person. 
• Competitive behavior – such as pushing, fighting etc. may contribute to 
disorder, chaotic atmosphere, enhanced risk of injuries, and can essentially 
affect the evacuation negatively in numerous other ways.  
• Insecurity – when a person of charge show signs of insecurity or hesitation, 
it gives other people reason to believe that he cannot be entirely trusted. 
 
 
On the contrary to the behaviors mentioned above, there also seemed to be 
behaviors that had a positive effect on the outcome of the evacuation;  
 
• Skepticism – proved to be a positive trait when questioning the doubtful 
information from the bridge. It may indeed have made a significant impact 
on the total assembly time. 
• Humor – made people relax a bit and become less anxious. 
• Leadership – strong leadership used in the right way can enhance the 
effectiveness of the evacuation. 
• Patience – the good patience of some made up for part of the competitive 
behavior conducted by others. 
• Goodwill and “heroism” – a great amount of people were helping others by 
giving away lifejackets, helping to carry people that weren’t able to walk 
themselves, or towing people that couldn’t swim, etc.  
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7 Conclusions 
For the purpose of this thesis paper, the behaviors of evacuees (as reported by 
media, survivors and official investigations) of the Costa Concordia disaster have 
been analyzed. The observations have then been compared with theoretical 
frameworks as an attempt to further enable the understanding of human behavior in 
the event of a passenger ship disaster. It showed that the behavioral models were 
useful for the interpretation of a passenger ship evacuation disaster, and it is 
suggested that they may also be valuable at a design stage when trying to predict the 
behaviors of people in a maritime disaster. 
 
A number of behavioral factors were found which might have contributed in 
reducing the effectiveness of the evacuation procedures: 
• Confusion 
• Freezing (also known as cognitive paralysis) 
• Competitive behavior  
• Insecurity and hesitation 
 
Several management and operational issues were identified that may have 
contributed in reducing the effectiveness of the evacuation procedures: 
• 696 passengers had not yet been briefed on the ship’s safety procedures (as 
this was scheduled for the following day, 14th of January). 
• The public and most of the staff were kept unaware of the severity of the 
situation, prohibiting them from getting mentally prepared for the 
evacuation. 
• The delay of the assembling and disembarking procedures caused precious 
time to be lost and led to a narrow time frame for effective launching of 
lifeboats and rafts. 
• Lack of communication between passengers and staff, as well as in between 
staff, involved language barriers and conflicting orders and led to confusion, 
misunderstandings and frustration among the passengers. 
• Seeming lack of understanding and adequate training among part of the staff 
caused disbelief in the leadership among passengers. 
 
To improve the safety in passenger ships, it is proposed that extra measures are 
taken in order to ensure that: 
• Passengers are given adequate information; prior to and during an 
emergency. 
• Staff is familiar with the emergency equipment and procedures. 
• Staff is able to communicate with each other as well as with passengers.  
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8 Future research 
The author would like to take the opportunity to encourage further investigation of 
the behaviors of evacuees in the Costa Concordia disaster, as well as other maritime 
disasters, in order to analyze the impact of human behaviors on the evacuation 
effectiveness. 
 
It is also proposed that future research investigate the use of the behavior sequence 
model, the affiliative model, the social influence model, and the role-rule model as 
tools during the design stage of evacuation planning in ships. 
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10 Appendix – Analyzed video material 
 
Title: Inside the Costa Concordia Disaster 
Published by: ABC News 
Date: January 20th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QInuFYRZwPw&list=PLtjiCrCch1UM9YB
osMHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c&index=2 
 
Title: Cruise Ship Sinking in Italy; 6 Bodies Found 
Published by: ABC News 
Date: January 16th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rjy9wek_yg&list=PLtjiCrCch1UM9YBosM
HsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c&index=187 
 
Title: Inside the Costa Concordia Disaster 
Published by: ABC News 
http://abcnews.go.com/2020/video/inside-costa-concordia-disaster-15408519 
 
Title: Raw Video: Panicked Passengers During Evacuation 
Published by: Associated Press 
Date: January 15th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Pxw8HYdopA 
 
Title: Amateur video from Costa Concordia cruise ship 
Published by: CBS News 
Date: January 20th, 2012, 3:02 PM 
http://www.cbsnews.com/media/amateur-video-from-costa-concordia-cruise-
ship/ 
 
Title: Costa Concordia passengers warned of "electrical fault" 
Published by: CBS News 
Date: January 17th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=guXCf8SCV1M 
 
Title: Audio recording shows ship evacuation delayed 
Published by: CBS 
Date: January 19th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJ2-_DudxJ4 
 
Title: American family tells how they survived cruise ship disaster 
Published by: CBS 
Date: January 16th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_dGqOJxKBDw&list=PLtjiCrCch1UM9YB
osMHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c&index=80 
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Title: Costa Concordia Cruise Liner wreck : amateur video footage : evacuation : 
Italy 
Published by: Creative Videos 
Date: January 15th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eE3QGlAf_7M 
 
Title: COSTA CONCORDIA INTERVIEW WITH PASSENGER 
Published by: cruiseandblog 
Date: January 17th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A74NGqFuDjQ 
 
Title: Surviving the Sinking of the Costa Concordia 
Published by: DailyHeraldClips 
Date: January 16th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RvUjlwhBsC0 
 
Title: Costa Concordia sinking 13.1.2012-The End  
Published by: David Dor 
Date: January 21th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V2GGShZmiXc&list=PLtjiCrCch1UM9YBo
sMHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c&index=27 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Cruise Sinks During Evacuation 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RZlExp7row 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Disaster Dining Room 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KAJW26okcUg 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Disaster Dining Room 2 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gCZFVE-xxmc 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Disaster Dining Room 3 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SSzlvXPy1SU&list=PLtjiCrCch1UM9YBos
MHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c&index=35 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Disaster Top Deck After Crash 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6Aw7xYE0EA 
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Title: Costa Concordia Disaster Shortly After Collission 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YzqXRKBz6CA 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Disaster - Our Cabin Afterward 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pg5L37qOep0 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Disaster - Buffet Plates Sliding 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CTtuyDJiMzI 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Disaster - About to board liferaft 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvJ5JIlXbNg 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Disaster - Waiting to Evacuate 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=velPhOKpwUY 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Disaster - Inside the life raft 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVE_LuUykFs 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Disaster - Evacuating in life raft 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8NcSvcMSS1w 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Evacuating While Cruise Ship Sinks 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNFtLap1bUo 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Cruise Sinking View From Liferaft 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WV1-UxH_yT4 
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Title: Costa Concordia Cruise Sinks During Evacuation 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RZlExp7row 
 
Title: Costa Concordia sinking right after we got off 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAhjYvEmdK0 
 
Title: Domnica Cermotan telling me I am not allowed to film the Costa Concordia 
sinking 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ag-IdQXOIfI 
 
Title: Very Shocking video of covered body on strecher being transported after 
Costa Concordia accident. 
Published by: David Saba 
Date: February 1st, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7XDm3nPZH24 
 
Title: Les dernières minutes du Costa Concordia. Comme si vous étiez 
Published by: Darna Television 
Date: January 25th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5zs2vZo57I 
 
Title: Costa Concordia, Captain Schettino audio (English subtitules) 
Published by: disconube Javier Ibáñez 
Date: January 17th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fq-AZz4FBfQ 
 
Title: Costa Concordia Latest NEW Video of Evacuation 2012 HD 
Published by: Kanal von MrPaulKalkbrenner 
Date: January 31st 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJV0T3LiGb8 
 
Title: Terror At Sea The Sinking Of The Concordia 
Published by: Maria Fernanda Farias 
Date: September 21st 2014 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5SaaBLhW2p4&list=PLtjiCrCch1UM9YBos
MHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c&index=4 
 
Title: sinking of the concordia caught on camera hdtv x264 c4tv p 
Published by: Matt Antcliff 
Date: July 20th, 2013 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4MtWxnRBVvg&t=10s 
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Title: 5/5 The accident Cruise "Costa Concordia" Shipwrecked in Italy 13 / 01 / 
2012 
Published by: Network 24 
Date: January 14th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCcoGhsL_CM 
 
Title: Costa Concordia: First pics of capsized cruise ship in Italy 
Published by: ODN 
Date: January 14th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ye1mj7LY2po&list=PLtjiCrCch1UM9YBos
MHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c&index=97 
 
Title: Costa Concordia amateur video shows evacuation in progress 
Published by: ODN 
Date: January 16th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YDw_IWnSzws 
 
Title: Costa Concordia: Dramatic footage showing the evacuation 
Published by: ODN 
Date: January 19th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b99S--7TVSY 
 
Title: Costa Concordia: Dramatic night vision footage shows ship evacuation 
Published by: ODN 
Date: January 17th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBr-T89M85Q 
 
Title: Costa Concordia: British passenger describes dramatic rescue 
Published by: ODN 
Date:  January 15th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cg5RJYOSqGs&index=17&list=PLFB4BBE
3BBE5E7FC2 
 
Title: Costa Concordia: The survivors stories from Giglio 
Published by: ODN 
Date: January 16th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
c0mXuDWsao&index=19&list=PLFB4BBE3BBE5E7FC2 
 
Title: Russian survivors talk about Costa Concordia disaster 
Published by: Rianews 
Date: January 16th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbQLzcRA7hA&index=89&list=PLtjiCrCch
1UM9YBosMHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c 
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Title: Amateur video: Shocked Costa Concordia passengers escape sinking liner 
Published by: RT 
Date: January 14th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcrBboNWVZ8 
 
Title: First video: Luxury Costa Concordia cruise ship runs aground 
Published by: RT 
Date: January 14th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYwLQDwqDCI 
 
Title: Night aerial video of Costa Concordia survivors getting into lifeboats 
Published by: RT 
Date: January 17th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ucxfdfDzTvY 
 
Title: Police underwater video inside stricken Costa Concordia 
Published by: RT 
Date: January 22nd, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8O5jKC2gISg 
 
Title: Costa Concordia accident: Aerial video of dramatic rescue operation 
Published by: RT 
Date: January 14th, 2012  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EqXkN0gVFbI 
 
Title: Cruise ship aground: More aerial views of Costa Concordia 
Published by: RT 
Date: January 14th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=daBOOwTpYg8&list=PLtjiCrCch1UM9YBo
sMHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c&index=90 
 
Title: Costa Costa Concordia cruise ship sinking 2012 
Published by: steven5149 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmQD1wCxMLI&list=PLtjiCrCch1UM9YB
osMHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c&index=66 
 
Title: Night vision footage shows Costa Concordia evacuation from the air 
Published by: The Telegraph 
Date: January 17th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_FQvW3HKZg 
 
Title: Passengers told ship running aground is an 'electrical fault' 
Published by: The Telegraph 
Date: January 15th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D0XsP5-zdhA 
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Title: Cruise disaster: new diver video shows inside Costa Concordia 
Published by: The Telegraph 
Date: January 19th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JT_Ong6iUyg&index=45&list=PLtjiCrCch1
UM9YBosMHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c 
 
Title: Video: Amateur video captures cruise ship evacuation panic – Telegraph 
Published by: The Telegraph 
Date: 15th, 2012, 9:46AM GMT 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9015901/Amateur-
video-captures-cruise-ship-evacuation-panic.html 
 
Title: Costa Concordia lifeboat escape: new footage 
Published by: The Telegraph 
Date: January 16th, 2012, 11:34AM GMT 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9017521/Costa-
Concordia-lifeboat-escape-new-footage.html 
 
Title: Costa Concordia: new video shows panic and disbelief on deck 
Published by: The Telegraph 
Date: February 12th, 2012, 1:21PM GMT  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9077404/Costa-
Concordia-new-video-shows-panic-and-disbelief-on-deck.html 
 
Title: Amateur video captures cruise ship evacuation panic 
Published by: The Telegraph 
Date: January 15th, 2012, 9:46AM GMT   
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9015901/Amateur-
video-captures-cruise-ship-evacuation-panic.html?fb 
 
Title: German passenger films moments after cruise ship runs aground 
Published by: The Telegraph 
Date: January 15th, 2012, 5:29PM GMT   
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9016409/German-
passenger-films-moments-after-cruise-ship-runs-aground.html 
 
Title: Cruise disaster: Chaos reigned as order came to abandon ship 
Published by: The Telegraph 
Date:  January14th, 2012, 10:22PM GMT  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9015749/Cruise-
disaster-Chaos-reigned-as-order-came-to-abandon-ship.html 
 
Title: Costa Condordia Cruise Ship disaster: live on board footage evacuation 
Published by: Werbung | TV | Kampagnen | News 
Date: January 16th, 2012: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZBiLRRZRCMw 
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Title: Costa Concordia Cruise Ship disaster: Footage of rescue efforts under water 
Published by: Werbung | TV | Kampagnen | News 
Date: January 16th, 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b92MpEZRIUQ&list=PLtjiCrCch1UM9YB
osMHsvPqwMQ6GgdC5c&index=109 
 
 
 
 
